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I . I N T R O D U C T I O N  
 The year 2019 was one of stasis and change, reaction and challenges to 
practitioners, patentees and those discontented with patents, and the judiciary 
itself.  The year saw a comeback of sorts for the doctrine of equivalents, which has 
been a quiet area of the law since the Supreme Court’s last word in Festo v. Shoketsu 
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. in 2002.1  In 2019 there were no fewer than seven cases 
decided by the Federal Circuit involving the doctrine, and its primary antithesis, the 
doctrine of prosecution history estoppel.2  The perennial issue of subject matter 
eligibility remained uncertain with the Federal Circuit deciding that method of 
treatment claims were patent-eligible as being an application of a natural law (and 
the Supreme Court taking the Solicitor General’s advice and not granting certiorari 
to review the wisdom of this dichotomy).3 Diagnostic method claims were another 
matter, with the Federal Circuit maintaining its jurisprudence that claims to such 
methods are almost per se patent-ineligible.  In doing so, however, its Athena 
Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Services LLC decision illustrated a court in frank 
internal disagreement (if not disarray) in denying patentee’s petition for rehearing 
en banc.4  The Supreme Court weighed in on the extent to which the Leahy-Smith 
America Invents Act changed the scope of novelty-destroying prior art (saying it 
didn’t, despite an amicus brief to the contrary by the Act’s co-author, Rep. Lamar 
Smith)5, and Section 112(a) came under scrutiny on both written description and 
enablement issues.6  Finally, as a fixed constant in an otherwise changing universe, 
the interference over CRISPR technology between the Broad Institute and its 
colleagues and the University of California, Berkeley  and its collaborators 
maintained its measured pace to a determination of who was first to invent 
CRISPR, and accordingly, who owns this important technology.7 
 
1  See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 344 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
2  Dennis Crouch, Doctrine of Equivalents at the Federal Circuit, Patently-O (Nov. 22, 2019), 
https://patentlyo.com/patent/2019/11/doctrine-equivalents-federal.html [https://perma.cc/29JU-
24L7]. 
3  See Vanda Pharm., Inc. v. West-Ward Pharm. Int’l Ltd., 887 F.3d 1117 (Fed. Cir. 2018), cert. 
denied, No. 18-817 (Jan. 13, 2020), https://www.supremecourt.gov/docket/docketfiles/html/
public/18-817.html [https://perma.cc/8QQT-H375]. 
4  915 F.3d 743 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
5  See Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 628 (2019). 
6  Idenix Pharm. LLC v. Gilead Scis. Inc., 941 F.3d 1149 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
7  Jon Cohen, The Latest Round in the CRISPR Patent Battle Has an Apparent Victor, But the Fight 
Continues, SCIENCE MAG (Sep. 11, 2020, 6:40 PM), https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2020/09/
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Admittedly, choosing the top ten judicial decisions suffers from an inevitable 
degree of subjectivity. However, we believe these decisions are among the most 
important decisions of the year in biotechnology patent law even if others might 
prefer to substitute a case or two for those on our list.  All of the decisions discussed 
in this article were delivered during the 2019 calendar year.8 
I I . T O P  T E N  B I O T E C H N O L O G Y  P A T E N T  L A W  C A S E S  O F  2 0 1 9  
We discuss the top ten biotechnology patent decisions below. These decisions 
are not presented in any particular order.  After consideration of individual judicial 
decisions, we conclude by suggesting what prospective impact these decisions may 
have on biotechnology patent law. 
A. *Helsinn Healthcare v. Teva Pharmaceuticals (on-sale bar) 
“Pigs fly!,” “Hell has frozen over!,”  or less dramatically, “Supreme Court affirms 
Federal Circuit decision!” all would be apt subtitles for any discussion of the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Helsinn v. Teva.9  The question before the Court was 
whether Congress intended, by passing the Smith-Leahy America Invents Act (AIA), 
to change the status of “secret” sales so that they would not trigger the on-sale bar 
of revised Section 102 by adding the phrase “or otherwise known to the public.” The 
Federal Circuit held it had not done so, at least not effectively,10 and the Supreme 
Court agreed.11 
The decision is short (nine pages, with the legal basis of the Court’s opinion 
starting at page five), unanimous (9–0 vote), handed down less than seven weeks 
after oral argument, and authored by Justice Thomas, who often writes patent law 




8  Much of the discussion of biotechnology law cases in this article is adapted, with full 
permission, from case summaries written by Dr. Kevin E. Noonan on his leading biotechnology 
patent law blog, www.PatentDocs.org.  The authors wish to thank Bobbie Jo Horocofsky and Mary 
Kate Workman for their brilliant research assistance.  This article will be published in spring 2021 
by the University of New Hampshire Law Review with whose permission the authors make it 
available in final published form. 
9  Helsinn, 139 S. Ct. at 628.  
10  Id. at 630. 
11  Id.  
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have a particular interest.12  By way of reminder regarding the factual predicate of 
the case, it arose over Hatch-Waxman litigation concerning Teva’s intention to 
market a generic version of Helsinn’s intravenous formulations of palonosetron 
used to reduce chemotherapy-induced nausea and vomiting (“CINV”).13  There were 
four patents-in-suit:  U.S. Patent Nos. 7,947,724, 7,947,725, 7,960,424, and 8,598,219; 
only the ‘219 Patent was allowed and granted under the AIA changes in U.S. patent 
law.14 
A prior art patent (U.S. Patent No. 5,202,333)15 taught that palonosetron was 
useful for treating CINV; the patents-in-suit were directed to novel formulations 
comprising “unexpectedly low concentrations of palonosetron.”16  Claim 2 of the 
‘725 Patent is representative of the pre-AIA patents-in-suit: 
2.  A pharmaceutically stable solution for reducing emesis or reducing the 
likelihood of emesis comprising: 
a)  0.05 mg/mL palonosetron hydrochloride, based on the weight of the free 
base, in a sterile injectable aqueous carrier at a pH of from 4.5 to 5.5; 
b)  from 0.005 mg/mL to 1.0 mg/mL EDTA; and 
c)  mannitol in an amount sufficient to tonicify said solution, in a 
concentration of from about 10 mg/ml to about 80 mg/ml.17 
Claim 1 is representative of the ‘219 Patent [post-AIA]. 
1. A pharmaceutical single-use, unit-dose formulation for intravenous 
administration to a human to reduce the likelihood of cancer chemotherapy- 
induced nausea and vomiting, comprising a 5 mL sterile aqueous isotonic solution, 
said solution comprising: 
palonosetron hydrochloride in an amount of 0.25 mg based on the weight of its 
free base; 
    from 0.005 mg/mL to 1.0 mg/mL EDTA; and 
    from 10 mg/mL to about 80 mg/mL mannitol, 
    wherein said formulation is stable at 24 months when stored at room 
 
12  See, e.g., Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics Inc., 569 U.S. 576 (providing an 
example of a Justice Thomas patent opinion).  
13  Helsinn, 139 S. Ct. at 630–31.  
14  Id. at 631 (discussing U.S. Patent No. 7,947,724 (filed July 21, 2005); U.S. Patent No. 7,947,725 
(filed Mar. 24, 2006); U.S. Patent No. 7,960,424 (filed Mar. 24, 2006); and U.S. Patent No. 8,598,219 
(filed May 23, 2013)). 
15  Id. (referring to U.S. Patent No. 5,202,333 (filed May 22, 1991)). 
16  Id.  
17   ‘725 Patent. 
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temperature.18 
“It [was] undisputed that each asserted claim covers the 0.25 mg dose of 
palonosetron.” 19   Helsinn entered into a contract for supplying the claimed 
formulation prior to the critical date, but contingent on FDA approval (which was 
not obtained until after the critical date).20 
The District Court found a sale or offer for sale prior to the critical date, but that 
the invention was not ready for patenting with regard to the pre-AIA patents, and 
that the AIA had changed the on-sale bar to require a public sale or offer for sale.21  
Although the existence of the agreement and its terms were publicly known, the 
parties had not disclosed the 0.25 mg palonosetron dose before the critical date.22  
The District Court thus rejected Teva’s invalidity contentions based on the § 102(b) 
on-sale bar.23 
The Federal Circuit reversed, in an opinion by Judge Dyk joined by Judges 
Mayer and Moore.24  Using the framework set forth by the Court in Medicines Co. v. 
Hospira, the panel found that the invention was “on sale” prior to the critical date by 
applying “the law of contracts as generally understood” and “those activities that 
would be understood to be commercial sales and offers for sale ‘in the commercial 
community.’”25  Under this analysis, the Court had little difficulty deciding that 
there had been a sale before the critical date. 26   The contingent nature of FDA 
approval did not refute this conclusion the Court saying that commercial , 
exemplified by provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), contemplate 
“‘purported present sale of future goods . . . [which] operates as a contract to sell,’ 
UCC § 2–105(2),” and that “[a] contract for sale that includes a condition precedent 
is a valid and enforceable contract.” 27   The opinion also cited the Court’s own 
precedent regarding the existence of a sale despite the presence of conditions 
precedent to commercial transfer of goods, such as Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe, 
 
18  Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 855 F.3d 1356, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
19  Id. 
20  Id. at 1361–62. 
21   Id. at 1360. 
22   Id. at 1363.  
23   Id.  
24  Helsinn, 855 F.3d at 1356.  
25  Helsinn, 855 F.3d at 1364; Kevin E. Noonan, The Medicines Company v. Hospira, Inc. (Fed. Cir. 
2016) (en banc), Patent Docs (July 12, 2016), https://www.patentdocs.org/2016/07/the-medicines-
company-v-hospira-inc-fed-cir-2016-en-banc.html [https://perma.cc/6RGX-Z3LS]. 
26  Helsinn, 855 F.3d at 1364. 
27  Id. at 1356 (citing BG Grp., PLC v. Republic of Argentina, 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1207 (2014)). 
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Inc  and C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc.28  
The Court also rejected Helsinn’s contention that the AIA changed the on-sale 
bar calculus to limit its application to public sales.29  Noting that confidential sales 
did not per se prevent application of the on-sale bar prior to enactment of the AIA, 
the opinion rejected arguments by Helsinn and amici (including the U.S. 
government) that the AIA changed the law. These assertions were based almost 
exclusively on statements from the Congressional record (which themselves were 
directed not to on-sale activities but to public use).30  It did not help Helsinn’s 
argument in this regard that the panel identified Supreme Court precedent directly 
contrary to their position, i.e  Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1, 19 (1829). 31  
Accordingly, the opinion stated that “[w]e conclude that, after the AIA, if the 
existence of the sale is public, the details of the invention need not be publicly 
disclosed in the terms of sale”  and thus  invalidity of the ‘219 Patent was not 
properly determined by the District Court.32 
With regard to the question of whether the invention claimed in the patents-in-
suit was “ready for patenting“ prior to the critical date, the panel decided that it was, 
because the invention had been reduced to practice before that date.33  This decision 
depended, in part, on the parties’ stipulation that “they would contest ready for 
patenting ‘only with respect to the limitations and intended uses of “reducing 
emesis or reducing the likelihood of emesis” and “to reduce the likelihood of cancer 
chemotherapy-induced nausea and vomiting “‘of the asserted claims’ and not ‘for 
any other reason.’”34  The panel noted that its case law distinguished the standard 
needed to show reduction to practice with regard to whether a pharmaceutical 
invention would work for its intended purpose and the standard for FDA approval 
of a new drug, citing Scott v. Finney.35 Specifically, the standard is that the invention 
“works for its intended purpose ‘beyond a probability of failure’ but not ‘beyond a 
possibility of failure.’” 36   The Federal Circuit found the District Court erred by 
applying the FDA standard rather than the proper patent standard in making its 
 
28  Id. at 1365–66 (citing Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe, Inc., 424 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2005) and 
C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). 
29  Id. at 1369–71. 
30  Id. at 1368–69. 
31  Id. at 1369. 
32  Id. at 1371.  
33  Id.  
34  Helsinn, 855 F.3d at 1372. 
35  Id. (citing Scott v. Finney, 34 F.3d 1058, 1063–64 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).  
36  Id. at 1372 (citing Scott, 34 F.3d 1062). 
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erroneous determination that the invention was not “ready for patenting” before 
the critical date.37  This conclusion was supported by Helsinn’s own documents 
(including portions of the patents’ prosecution histories), pre-litigation statements  
and testimony. 38   And the opinion noted that if the standard applied by the 
District Court was correct Helsinn could not have filed a valid application prior to 
the critical date, and “[s]uch a standard would preclude the filing of meritorious 
patent applications in a wide variety of circumstances.”39 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the following Question 
Presented: “Whether, under the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, an inventor’s 
sale of an invention to a third party that is obligated to keep the invention 
confidential qualifies as prior art for purposes of determining the patentability of 
the invention.”40  The Court recognized that it had “never addressed the precise 
question presented in this case,” but voiced its opinion that “our precedents suggest 
that a sale or offer of sale need not make an invention available to the public.”41  The 
Court based its decision on the well-established principle that, under prior versions 
of Section 102, “secret sales” could trigger the on-sale bar.42  These cases were as 
recent as Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc.,43 and as ancient as a trio of 19th Century 
cases44  (although to be honest these cases stand for the proposition that a sale 
triggers the bar and not the issue of whether the sale was secret or public).  The 
opinion credits the Federal Circuit (saying without apparent irony that that Court 
“has ‘exclusive jurisdiction’ over patent appeals, 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)”) with making 
“explicit what was implicit in our precedents” with regard to the on-sale bar, citing 
Special Devices, Inc. v. OEA, Inc  Woodland Trust v. Flowertree Nursery, Inc., in support 
of its conclusion.45 
Based on this various precedent, the Court was able to reach the conclusion that 
Congress did not change what activities raised the on-sale bar which includes secret 
sales, because there was insufficient evidence of that intent, citing Shapiro v. United 
 
37  Id. at 1373.  
38  Id. at 1373–75. 
39  Id. at 1375. 
40  Helsinn, 139 S. Ct. at 628, question presented report, No. 17-1229 (June 25, 2018). 
41  Id. at 633. 
42  Id.  
43  525 U.S. 55 (1998). 
44  See Smith & Griggs Mfg. Co. v. Sprague, 123 U.S. 249 (1887); Elizabeth v. Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 
126 (1878); Consolidated Fruit-Jar Co. v. Wright, 94 U.S. 92 (1877). 
45  Helsinn, 139 S. Ct. at 633 (citing Special Devices, Inc. v. OEA, Inc., 270 F. 3d 1353, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 
2001), and Woodland Trust v. Flowertree Nursery, Inc., 148 F. 3d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). 
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States.46  The Court relied expressly on the Solicitor General’s argument that “if ‘on 
sale’ had a settled meaning before the AIA was adopted, then adding the phrase ‘or 
otherwise available to the public’ to the statute ‘would be a fairly oblique way of 
attempting to overturn’ that ‘settled body of law.’”47 In reaching this conclusion  the 
Court rejected Helsinn’s argument, based on the “associated-words canon” of 
legislative intent, that the effect of construing the statute as Teva advanced and 
the Court accepted would read the amended words out of the statute. 48  The 
opinion points out that the catch-all phrase “otherwise available to the public” is 
better interpreted to capture “material that does not fit neatly into the statute’s 
enumerated categories but is nevertheless meant to be covered”; “on-sale” having a 
defined meaning the Court declined to encompass its proscriptions into what 
constitutes being on-sale.49 
The Court also, as can be its wont, waxed somewhat philosophical regarding the 
limitations on Congressional authority for patenting (reproduced here as a sage 
reminder of the underpinnings of much of the Court’s patent jurisprudence): 
The United States Constitution authorizes Congress “[t]o promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”  Art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.  Under 
this grant of authority, Congress has crafted a federal patent system that encourages 
“the creation and disclosure of new, useful, and nonobvious advances in technology and 
design” by granting inventors “the exclusive right to practice the invention for a period 
of years.” Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151, 109 S.Ct. 971, 103 
L.Ed.2d 118 (1989).  
 
To further the goal of “motivating innovation and enlightenment” while also “avoiding 
monopolies that unnecessarily stifle competition,” Pfaff, 525 U.S., at 63, 119 S.Ct. 304, 
Congress has imposed several conditions on the “limited opportunity to obtain a 
property right in an idea,” Bonito Boats, supra, at 149, 109 S.Ct. 971.  One such condition is 
the on-sale bar, which reflects Congress’ “reluctance to allow an inventor to remove 
existing knowledge from public use” by obtaining a patent covering that knowledge.50  
Congressman Lamar Smith, the Chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary of the 
 
46   Id. at 633–34 (citing Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 16 (1948)).   
47  Id. at 634. 
48  Id.  
49  Id.  
50  Id. at 632–33. See Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 64; see also Pennock v. Dialogue, 2 Pet. 1, 19 (1829) (explaining 
that “it would materially retard the progress of science and the useful arts" to allow an inventor to 
“sell his invention publicly” and later “take out a patent” and “exclude the public from any farther 
use than what should be derived under it”). 
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U.S. House of Representatives during the pendency of the AIA, and the lead sponsor 
of the bill in the House filed an amicus brief to the Court explaining Congressional 
intent, which was unpersuasive to the Court.51 
The Court’s language left the door slightly ajar for a future litigant to 
distinguish this decision on different facts (for example, where there was no 
disclosure that the agreement existed). The Court was uncharacteristically cautious 
in its language (“a commercial sale to a third party who is required to keep the 
invention confidential may place the invention ‘on sale’ under the AIA.”). 52  
Congress, if sufficiently aggrieved by the Court’s dismissal of Congressman Smith’s 
amicus brief explaining Congressional intent, could decide to include an express 
provision into the statute overturning this decision.  But it is clear that only 
something that express will be enough to convince the Court that their own and the 
Federal Circuit’s extensive jurisprudence has in fact been discarded by the changes 
to U.S. patent law occasioned by passage of the AIA. 
B. OSI Pharmaceuticals, LLC v. Apotex Inc. (Fed Cir. 2019) 
The Federal Circuit overturned an obviousness determination in an inter partes 
review (IPR) proceeding by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board in OSI Pharmaceuticals 
LLC v. Apotex Inc.53  The Court also reaffirmed its holdings in earlier-decided cases 
that applying the IPR portion of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act to patents 
arising from applications filed before enactment of the AIA is not 
unconstitutional.54 
The challenged patent, U.S. Patent No. 6,900,221, was listed in the Orange Book 
for OSI’s cancer treatment Tarceva® (erlotinib), an epidermal growth factor 
receptor (EGFR) inhibitor used in the treatment of non-small cell lung cancer 
(NSCLC). 55   The opinion explains that NSCLC was the leading cause of cancer 
deaths in 2000, amounting to greater than one million cases. 56   At that time, 
chemotherapy was the standard therapy but was limited by the toxicity of most 
cancer chemotherapeutic agents, which showed little specificity by killing normal 
 
51  See Helsinn, 139 S. Ct. 628. 
52  Id. at 630. (emphasis added). 
53  939 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
54  Id. at 1385–86.  
55  Id. at 1378. 
56  Id. at 1377.  
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as well as cancer cells.57 
Efforts during the timeframe of the earliest claimed priority date of the ‘221 
Patent were directed to EGFR inhibitors, but importantly for the Court’s 
decision the opinion notes that “many of these [EGFR inhibitors] failed in clinical 
trials.”58  One reason for these negative outcomes, according to the opinion, is that 
“[c]ancer treatment is highly unpredictable” and that while some promising 
compounds were effective in vitro, such successes were “a poor proxy for how 
effective that drug actually was in treating cancer in vivo (i.e., in the body)” (the 
opinion cites several reasons for these results). 59   The opinion also recites the 
regulatory hurdles prospective drugs must overcome, and that “[a] great majority of 
therapies for NSCLC failed in clinical trials” including the 1631 new drugs for 
treating NSCLC between 1990 and 2005, and the mere seven that were approved by 
the FDA, one of which was OSI’s erlotinib.60 
Before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, Petitioner challenged claims 44 46 
and 53 of the ‘221 Patent  for being unpatentable as obvious: 
44.  A method for the treatment of NSCLC (non small cell lung cancer), pediatric 
malignancies, cervical and other tumors caused or promoted by human papilloma virus 
(H[P]V), Barrett’s esophagus (pre-malignant syndrome), or neoplastic cutaneous 
diseases in a mammal comprising administering to said mammal a therapeutically 
effective amount of a pharmaceutical composition comprised of at least one of N-(3-
ethynylphenyl)-6,7-bis(2-methoxyethoxy)-4-quinazolinamine, or pharmaceutically 
acceptable salts thereof in anhydrous or hydrate forms, and a carrier. 
45. The method of claim 44, wherein the treatment further comprises a palliative or 
neoadjuvant/adjuvant monotherapy. 
46.  The method of claim 44, wherein the treatment further comprises blocking 
epidermal growth factor receptors (EGFR). 
53.  The method of claim 44 for the treatment of non-small cell lung cancer (NSCLC).61 
The asserted prior art disclosed “a class of ‘4-(substituted phenylamino) quinazoline 
derivatives which are useful in the treatment of hyperproliferative diseases, such as 
cancers, in mammals” (Schnur); a scientific review article summarizing studies 
related to cell signaling mechanisms and molecules like EGFR involved therein with 
 
57  B.G. Peters, An overview of chemotherapeutic toxicities, Top Hosp Pharm Manage 14(2): 59-88 
(1994). 
58  OSI Pharmaceuticals, 939 F.3d at 1377.  
59  Id. at 1377–78 (citing “poor pharmacokinetics due to poor absorption or rapid metabolism (or 
both), undesirable drug-drug interactions, drug toxicity due to drug binding onto healthy cells, 
drug toxicity due to binding onto other receptors, and metabolite toxicity”). 
60  Id. at 1378. 
61  OSI Pharmaceuticals, 939 F.3d at 1378–79.  
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regard to malignant tumors (Gibbs); and OSI’s 10-K filing with the Security and 
Exchange Commission. 62   Schnur discloses 105 different compounds including 
erlotinib (a “preferred” compound) and that this compound could be used as a 
treatment for cancers of many tissues, including lung (but not specifically 
NSCLC).63  Gibbs discloses that erlotinib was in clinical development with “good 
anti-cancer activity in preclinical models.”64  The Gibbs reference discloses other 
references that did not disclose erlotinib for use in treating NSCLC and had no data 
regarding the use of erlotinib for treating NSCLC. 65   OSI’s 10-K discloses the 
company’s efforts to obtain FDA approval of erlotinib for treating NSCLC (as well as 
several other tumor types).66  This disclosure was limited to Phase I and Phase II 
clinical trials  and there were no clinical trial data in the document.67 
The Board held that “a person of ordinary skill ‘would have combined Gibbs or 
OSI 10-K with Schnur and had a reasonable expectation of success of achieving the 
invention of challenged claims 44 and 53.”68 Specifically, the Board found that all the 
limitations of claims 44 and 53 were disclosed in the Schnur reference except 
treatment of NSCLC with erlotinib. This element of the claims was disclosed in 
OSI’s 10-K or in the Gibbs disclosure that erlotinib “appear[s] to have good anti-
cancer activity in preclinical models with an acceptable therapeutic index 
particularly in patients with non-small cell lung cancer” (albeit without any 
disclosure of clinical data to support these activities). 69   The Board entered 
judgment in the IPR that claims 44 46 and 53 were invalid for obviousness, and OSI 
appealed.70 
The Federal Circuit reversed, in an opinion by Judge Stoll, joined by Judges 
Newman and Taranto.71  While acknowledging that the Board’s factual findings 
were due deferential “substantial evidence” review, citing Dickinson v. Zurko, “‘[m]ere 
 
62  Id. at 1379–80. 
63  Id. at 1379.  
64  Id.  
65  Id. at 1379–80. 
66  Id. at 1380. 
67  Id.  
68  Id. at 1381.  
69  OSI Pharmaceuticals, 939 F.3d at 1383 (emphasis omitted). 
70  Id.  
71  Id. at 1377.  
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speculation’ is not substantial evidence” according to the opinion.72  The panel used 
the District Court standard to illustrate that “substantial evidence is not a fixed 
quantum of evidence, and may only be determined with respect to the standard of 
proof”73 (although the relevance to the issue before the Court is not immediately 
apparent).  Nevertheless, the opinion states that “[t]he same point logically applies 
to review of the Board’s finding.”74 Applying these standards, the panel held that the 
Board’s finding was not supported by substantial evidence because: 
As an initial matter, in reaching its conclusion, the Board misinterpreted the asserted 
references to teach more than substantial evidence supports.  When the references are 
properly read, the Board’s finding that the asserted references provide a reasonable 
expectation of success also is not supported by substantial evidence.  To be clear, the 
claims require only treatment of a mammal with erlotinib—efficacy in humans is not 
required.  But the asserted references do not disclose any data or other information 
about erlotinib’s efficacy in treating NSCLC.  The record does not contain any clinical 
(human) data or pre-clinical (animal) data.  It does not even include in vitro (test tube) 
data regarding erlotinib’s effect on NSCLC.  At the same time, it is undisputed that 
NSCLC treatment was highly unpredictable with an over 99.5% rate of failure for drugs 
entering Phase II clinical studies.  On this record, we are not persuaded that a 
reasonable factfinder could conclude that a person of ordinary skill would have 
reasonably expected success based on the combination of Schnur and Gibbs or Schnur 
and OSI’s 10-K.75 
The opinion then sets out, for each reference, the deficiencies in the Board’s 
understanding of the references and why alone or in combination they don’t 
support an obviousness determination by substantial evidence. Gibbs, according to 
the panel, is merely a review article with no independent data of its own, and the 
data of others it does disclose does not include data showing that erlotinib could be 
used to treat NSCLC.76  The references cited by Gibbs (who submitted a declaration 
in support of patentee during the IPR) that disclosed erlotinib did not disclose its 
use for treating NCSLC  and the references disclosing NSCLC treatments did not 
disclose erlotinib, according to the opinion.77 
Turning to the question of whether the cited art would provide the required 
reasonable expectation of success, the panel held that “properly read” the cited art 
 
72  Id. at 1382 (citing Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 162 (1999), and Intellectual Ventures I LLC 
v. Motorola Mobility LLC, 870 F.3d 1320, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2017)). 
73  Id. (citing Eli Lilly & Co. v. Aradigm Corp., 376 F.3d 1352, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). 
74  Id. (citing In re Hotels.com, L.P., 573 F.3d 1300, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2009)). 
75  Id. at 1382–83 (emphasis in original). 
76  OSI Pharmaceuticals, 939 F.3d at 1383–84. 
77  Id. 
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did not.78  Regarding the combination of the Schnur and Gibbs references, “the 
asserted references do not disclose any information about erlotinib’s efficacy in 
treating NSCLC in a mammal,” according to the Court.79  The Schnur reference 
“fails to disclose any in vitro or in vivo efficacy data for erlotinib or otherwise suggest 
the use of erlotinib to treat NSCLC”  and Gibbs, “[p]roperly read in context,[] 
discloses only that erlotinib inhibits the EGFR and has good anticancer activity in 
some cancers, not including NSCLC.”80  The absence of any data “or other promising 
information regarding erlotinib’s efficacy in treating NSCLC,” combined with the 
“highly unpredictable nature of treating NCSLC” precluded  in the Court’s view  
these references from providing the skilled worker with a reasonable expectation of 
success regarding the claimed inventive methods.81 
With regard to the combination of the Schnur reference and OSI’s 10-K 
document, the Court found fault with the Board’s reliance on the existence of Phase 
I and Phase II clinical trials in the 10-K document again without any data or 
reference to data showing that erlotinib could successfully treat NSCLC. 82  The 
panel also placed the Board’s reliance on the 10-K statements in the context of the 
failure of 1630 putative EGFR-directed anti-cancer compounds (a 99.5% failure rate) 
and faulted the Board for not considering this evidence when weighing the 
reasonableness of any likelihood for success the 10-K disclosed information would 
have had on the skilled artisan.83  “These references provide no more than hope—
and hope that a potentially promising drug will treat a particular cancer is not 
enough to create a reasonable expectation of success in a highly unpredictable art 
such as this,” according to the opinion.84 
The United States intervened over OSI’s other grounds for appeal, questioning 
the constitutionality of subjecting to inter partes review proceedings patents arising 
from applications filed before passage of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act.85  
The opinion notes that only after oral argument in this case did the Federal Circuit 
decide that applying IPR to pre-AIA patents is not a constitutional violation.86  In 
 
78  Id. at 1384. 
79  Id.  
80  Id.  
81  Id. 
82  OSI Pharmaceuticals, 939 F.3d at 1385. 
83  Id. 
84  Id.  
85  Id. at 1385–86.  
86  Id. at 1386 (citing Celgene Corp. v. Peter, 931 F.3d 1342, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2019), and Arthrex, Inc. 
v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 935 F.3d 1319, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2019)). 
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the face of this precedent, OSI conceded and the panel entered judgment in 
accordance with its earlier decisions that applying the IPR statute to pre-AIA 
patents is not unconstitutional.87 
C. *Amgen v Sandoz (en banc) 
The latest chapter (and perhaps last) in the long-running dispute between 
Amgen and Sandoz over Sandoz’s Zarxio® biosimilar to Amgen’s Neupogen® 
biologic drug came to a close when the Federal Circuit affirmed grant of summary 
judgment against Amgen in Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc.88 
To recap, Amgen’s Neupogen® product (filgrastim) is “a recombinant analog of 
granulocyte-colony stimulating factor (‘G-CSF’), a naturally-occurring human 
glycoprotein that stimulates the production of neutrophils and stem cells and their 
release into the bloodstream.”89  It is used to treat patients with a deficiency of white 
blood cells (neutropenia), typically caused by treatment with certain cancer 
chemotherapeutic agents.90  In 2014, Sandoz filed an abbreviated biologic license 
application (aBLA) under the provisions of § 351(k) of the Public Health Service Act 
(42 U.S.C. §262(k)) for approval of its Zarxio® biosimilar. 91   However, Sandoz 
refused to comply with provisions of the Biologic Price Control and Innovation Act 
(BPCIA) requiring a biosimilar applicant to disclose its application and any relevant 
manufacturing information to reference product sponsor Amgen. 92   Amgen 
brought suit  but the District Court denied Amgen’s motion for preliminary 
injunction, ruling that such disclosure was not mandatory.93  Amgen appealed to the 
Federal Circuit, who in a fractured decision agreed with Sandoz.94  The Supreme 
 
87  Id.  
88  923 F.3d 1023 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
89  Id. at 1025. 
90  Id.  
91  Id. 
92  Id. 
93  Order on Cross Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings and Denying Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction, Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., No. 14-cv-04741-RS (N.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2015); see also Andrew 
Williams, Gotta Dance? Apparently Not – A Biosimilar Update, Patent Docs (Mar. 19, 2015), 
https://www.patentdocs.org/2015/03/gotta-dance-apparently-not-a-biosimilar-update.html 
[https://perma.cc/TS46-ZLUB]. 
94  Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 794 F.3d 1347, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2015); see Kevin E. Noonan, Amgen v. 
Sandoz (Fed. Cir. 2015), Patent Docs (July 22, 2015), https://www.patentdocs.org/2015/07/amgen-
v-sandoz-fed-cir-2015.html [https://perma.cc/Y27L-WRUD]; and Kevin E. Noonan, Federal Circuit 
Decides Amgen v. Sandoz (in an opinion that will make neither party happy), Patent Docs (July 21, 
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Court granted certiorari and also agreed with Sandoz.95  And upon remand to the 
Federal Circuit, Amgen lost any chance of obtaining an injunction on the ground 
that the state law claims (unfair competition among them) asserted by Amgen were 
preempted by the BPCIA, which contained no provision for an injunction under 
these circumstances. 96   During this time, the FDA had approved Zarxio® 97  and 
Sandoz was marketing the Neupogen® biosimilar.98 
Amgen pursued its patent case on the merits, asserting U.S. Patent Nos. 
6,162,427 and 8,940,878. 99   The ‘427 Patent is directed to methods for treating 
patients in need of peripheral stem cell transplantation; Amgen asserted claim 1 in 
the District Court action: 
1.  A method of treating a disease requiring peripheral stem cell transplantation in a 
patient in need of such treatment, comprising 
administering to the patient a hematopoietic stem cell mobilizing-effective amount of 
G-CSF; and 
thereafter administering to the patient a disease treating-effective amount of at least 
one chemotherapeutic agent.100 
The ‘878 Patent is directed at protein purification methods using adsorbent 
chromatography; claim 7 was at issue before the District Court: 
7.  A method of purifying a protein expressed in a non-native limited solubility form in 
a non-mammalian expression system comprising: 
(a) expressing a protein in a non-native limited solubility form in a non-mammalian 
cell; 




95  Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1664 (2017); see Kevin E. Noonan & Andrew Williams, 
Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc. (2017), Patent Docs (June 12, 2017), https://www.patentdocs.org/2017
/06/sandoz-inc-v-amgen-inc-2017.html [https://perma.cc/YR5T-EZLL]. 
96  Sandoz, 137 S. Ct. at 1669. 
97  See Kevin E. Noonan, FDA Approves Sandoz Filgrastim Biosimilar, Patent Docs (Mar. 8, 2015), 
https://www.patentdocs.org/2015/03/fda-approves-sandoz-filgrastim-biosimilar.html 
[https://perma.cc/7KWA-P64A]. 
98  See Kevin E. Noonan, Sandoz' NEUPOGEN® Biosimilar Now on the Market, PATENT DOCS (Sept. 
7, 2015), https://www.patentdocs.org/2015/09/sandoz-neupogen-biosimilar-now-on-the-market
.html [https://perma.cc/XPE9-CPBJ]. 
99  Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., No. 14-CV-04741-RS, 2016 WL 4137563, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2016) 
(deciding U.S. Patent No. 8,940,878 (filed June 24, 2010); U.S. Patent No. 6,162,427 (filed Nov. 12, 
1998). 
100  Amgen Inc., 923 F.3d at 1026 (reviewing ‘427 Patent). 
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(c) solubilizing the expressed protein in a solubilization solution comprising one or 
more of the following: 
  (i) a denaturant; 
      (ii) a reductant; and 
      (iii) a surfactant; 
(d) forming a refold solution comprising the solubilization solution and a refold buffer, 
the refold buffer comprising one or more of the following: 
      (i) a denaturant; 
      (ii) an aggregation suppressor; 
      (iii) a protein stabilizer; and 
      (iv) a redox component; 
(e) directly applying the refold solution to a separation matrix under conditions suitable 
for the protein to associate with the matrix; 
(f) washing the separation matrix; and 
(g) eluting the protein from the separation matrix, wherein the separation matrix is a 
non-affinity resin selected from the group consisting of ion exchange, mixed mode, and 
a hydrophobic interaction resin.101 
Central to the issues on appeal was the District Court’s claim construction where 
the Court construed “disease treating-effective amount of at least one 
chemotherapeutic agent” in claim 1 of the ‘427 Patent to be limited to “[a]n amount 
sufficient to treat a disease for which at least one chemotherapeutic agent is 
prescribed.” The Court thereby rejected Amgen’s asserted construction that the 
amount must be merely sufficient to mobilize stem cells regardless of its effect on 
the underlying disease.102  Under this construction, Amgen stipulated Sandoz did 
not infringe claim 1 of the ‘427 Patent pending appeal to the Federal Circuit.103 
The District Court construed the terms relating to the “washing” and “eluting” 
steps of the method claimed in the ‘878 Patent specifically, subparts (f) and (g)) as 
being separate steps that required the washing step to be performed before the 
eluting step.104  Again, under this construction Amgen conceded it could not prevail 
on infringement because Sandoz performed these steps concurrently with step (e) 
(regarding application of the refolding solution).105  This appeal followed. 
The Federal Circuit affirmed, in an opinion by Judge Lourie joined by Judges 
 
101  Amgen Inc., 923 F.3d at 1026.  
102  Id. at 1027. 
103  Id.  
104  Id. 
105  Id. 
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O’Malley and Reyna.106  Regarding construction of the claims of the ‘878 Patent, the 
panel credited Sandoz’s argument that the claim “logically requires a series of 
steps,” citing (as did Sandoz) Mformation Technologies, Inc. v. Research in Motion Ltd.107  
The Federal Circuit, like the District Court, rejected Amgen’s argument that 
washing and eluting could be performed simultaneously, for example, under 
circumstances where “washing may occur toward the bottom of the matrix at the 
same time that elution occurs toward the top.”108  The Court’s reasoning was based 
in part on the ordered (and sequentially lettered) steps (a) through (g), which 
“logically” implies they be performed in sequence.109  This ordered performance of 
the steps was also consistent with how the process was described in the 
specification.110 
Having determined that the District Court’s construction was correct as a 
matter of law (and thus that Sandoz process did not literally infringe claim 7 of the 
‘878 Patent, the Federal Circuit then considered infringement under the doctrine of 
equivalents.111  Using language that arguably was at least in part responsible for 
energizing the Supreme Court to review more closely the Federal Circuit’s 
stewardship of the Court’s patent jurisprudence (inter alia, in Warner-Jenkinson v. 
Hilton Davis Chemical Co. and Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. 
almost a generation ago),112 the panel dismissed Amgen’s doctrine of equivalents 
argument. The panel stated “[t]he doctrine of equivalents applies only in exceptional 
cases and is not ‘simply the second prong of every infringement charge, regularly 
available to extend protection beyond the scope of the claims.’”113  More correctly 
(and less provocatively), the panel based its decision on the sound reasoning that 
“Sandoz does not infringe claim 7 under the doctrine of equivalents because its one-
step, one-solution purification process works in a substantially different way from 
 
106  Amgen Inc., 923 F.3d at 1024. 
107  Id. at 1028 (citing Information Technologies, Inc. v. Research in Motion Ltd., 764 F.3d 1392, 
1398–1400 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ("a process claim is properly limited to a certain order of steps 'when the 
claim language, as a matter of logic or grammar, requires that the steps be performed in the order 
written, or the specification directly or implicitly requires' an order of steps.")). 
108  Id. at 1028–29. 
109  Id.  
110  Id.  
111  Amgen Inc., 923 F.3d at 1029.  
112  See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997);  Festo Corp., 344 F.3d 
at 1359. 
113  Amgen Inc., 923 F.3d at 1029 (citing its pre-Warner Jenkinson precedent in London v. Carson 
Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991).  
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the claimed three-step, three-solution process” recited in Amgen’s claims.114 
The opinion also rejected Amgen’s argument that the District Court abused its 
discretion in not denying or postponing summary judgment under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 56(d) because Sandoz “intends” (undisputedly), sometime in an 
uncertain future, to change its purification protocol to (perhaps) an infringing one  
but has provided neither Amgen nor the FDA with details of its plans.115  As the Court 
held in Sunovion Pharm., Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., while district courts cannot 
ignore amendments to ANDA or aBLA applications in determining whether there is 
(artificial) infringement under § 271(e)(2), they also have “a broad mandate to 
render a ‘just, speedy, and inexpensive’ decision.” 116  The opinion discounted 
Amgen’s argument that failure to postpone judgment would deny them of a remedy 
if Sandoz changed its process to an infringing one, on the grounds that Amgen 
could pursue a remedy for infringement to the extent that principles of res judicata 
and collateral estoppel were not violated, citing Bayer AG v. Biovail Corp.117 Under the 
circumstances before the Court in this case (particularly because the possible 
changes Sandoz might make would still not result in an infringing process), the 
Federal Circuit held the District Court did not abuse its discretion in declining to 
postpone entry of summary judgment.118  This aspect of the decision highlights a 
disparity in information first encountered when Sandoz refused to disclose either 
its aBLA or manufacturing information under Paragraph 2 of the BPCIA (42 U.S.C. 
§ 262 (l)(2)).119  The District Court (expressly), the Federal Circuit, and the Supreme 
Court evinced their presumption that all requisite information could be obtained 
during discovery in an ensuing lawsuit (disregarding the disadvantage their 
interpretation of the statute propagated regarding which patent(s) a reference 
product sponsor such as Amgen should sue on in the absence of this information).120  
Again, here, the Federal Circuit presumed that Amgen will be able to obtain the 
information necessary to file a well-pleaded complaint in the event Sandoz begins 
practicing an infringing version of its purification method. The court’s 
 
114  Id.  
115  Id. at 1029–30. 
116  Amgen Inc., 923 F.3d at 1030; see Sunovion Pharm., Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 731 F.3d 1271, 
1279–80 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (citing In re Micron Tech., Inc., 875 F.3d 1091, 1100 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting 
Dietz v. Bouldin, 136 S. Ct. 1885, 1891 (2016)). 
117  Amgen Inc., 923 F.3d at 1031; see Bayer AG v. Biovail Corp., 279 F.3d 1340, 1349–50 (Fed. Cir. 
2002). 
118  Amgen Inc., 923 F.3d at 1031. 
119  Id. at 1025. 
120  Sandoz Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1664; Amgen Inc., 923 F.3d at 1023; Amgen Inc., 2016 WL 4137563 at *1. 
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presumption did not address Amgen’s argument that there is a possibility that they 
will not have and will not be able to obtain the information, under circumstances 
where the Court had at least some leverage to obtain binding representations from 
Sandoz that this information would be made available should that time come.121 
Turning to the ‘427 Patent, the panel also affirmed the District Court’s 
construction of the term “disease treating-effective amount of at least one 
chemotherapeutic agent” to be limited to “an amount sufficient to treat a disease 
for which at least one chemotherapeutic agent is prescribed.”122  The Federal Circuit 
rejected Amgen’s argument that the amount need not be effective to treat the 
underlying disease but only be sufficient to mobilize stem cells in blood or bone 
marrow.123  The opinion based this construction on the preamble (“[a] method of 
treating a disease”)  and (according to the Court) “neither the claim nor the 
specification lends support to Amgen’s interpretation.” 124   Under Amgen’s 
construction, the claim would encompass activities directed solely at mobilizing 
stem cells, which would require the “disease treatment” to correspond to stem cell 
mobilization per se.125  There is no basis for this interpretation in the panel’s view, 
and thus the Court affirmed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment.126 
Four months later, the Federal Circuit issued an order modifying its opinion to 
read:  “The doctrine of equivalents applies only in exceptional cases and is not 
‘simply the second prong of every infringement charge, regularly available to extend 
protection beyond the scope of the claims,’” thus removing the Court’s latest 
provocation of the Supreme Court.127 
D. Ajinomoto v. ITC  
The Federal Circuit again reviewed a determination of infringement under the 
doctrine of equivalents, in this instance by the International Trade Commission 
(ITC again finding that one of the Supreme Court’s exceptions to the preclusive 
effects of prosecution history estoppel (the “tangential relationship” test) applied
 
121  Amgen Inc., 923 F.3d at 1031. 
122  Id. at 1027. 
123  Id.  
124  Id. 
125  Id.  
126  Id. at 1031–32.  
127  Order on Petition for Panel Rehearing, Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., No. 2018-1551 (Fed. Cir. 
2019). 
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and affirmed the ITC’s finding of infringement under the doctrine.128 
Ajinomoto petitioned the ITC under Section 337 (19 U.S.C. § 1337) for an 
exclusion order against CJ Cheiljedang for importing animal feed-grade L-
tryptophan amino acid products produced by several different strains of Escherichia 
coli, which Ajinimoto alleged infringed its U.S. Patent No. 7,666,655.129  The relevant 
claim of the ‘655 Patent (claim 20) is directed to “method[s] for producing an 
aromatic L-amino acid, which comprises cultivating the bacterium according to any 
one of claims 9–12, 13, 14, 15–18, or 19.”130  With regard to the claimed bacteria, claims 
9 and 15 are relevant to the Commission’s (and the Court’s) decision: 
9.  A recombinant Escherichia coli bacterium, which has the ability to accumulate 
aromatic L-amino acid in a medium, wherein the aromatic L-amino acid production by 
said bacterium is enhanced by enhancing activity of a protein in a cell of said bacterium 
beyond the levels observed in a wild-type of said bacterium, 
[1] and in which said protein consists of the amino acid sequence of SEQ ID NO: 2 
[2] and said protein has the activity to make the bacterium resistant to L-
phenylalanine, fluoro-phenylalanine or 5[-]fluoro-DL-tryptophan, 
[3] wherein the activity of the protein is enhanced by [3a] transformation of the 
bacterium with a DNA encoding the protein to express the protein in the 
bacterium, [3b] by replacing the native promoter which precedes the DNA on the 
chromosome of the bacterium with a more potent promoter, [3c] or by introduction 
of multiple copies of the DNA encoding said protein into the chromosome of said 
bacterium to express the protein in said bacterium.131 
Claim 15 differs from claim 9 with regard to the protein limitation [1], wherein the 
protein is limited by nucleotide sequence encoding the amino acid sequence rather 
claim being limited by the amino acid sequence per se; important to the Court’s 
decision is that claim 15 limits the species of nucleotide sequences to those that 
hybridize to the sequence corresponding to the amino acid sequence under 
specified hybridization conditions.132 
The claimed bacteria have been genetically engineered to increase L-aromatic 
amino acid production by fermentation and in particular production of L-
tryptophan.133  The basis for this increased production depends on an E. coli gene, 
 
128  Ajinomoto Co. v. USITC, 932 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
129  Id. at 1345 (reviewing U.S. Patent No. 7,666,655 (filed Nov. 25, 2002)). 
130  Id. at 1346. 
131  Id. at 1346–47 (boldface numbers were added by the Court in the opinion).    
132  Id. at 1347.  
133  Ajinomoto, 932 F.3d at 1346. 
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yddG, that encodes the YddG protein.134  This protein is an aromatic amino acid 
transporter that causes the bacteria to excrete these amino acids into the culture 
medium.135  This is achieved in one of three ways: either by introducing (via plasmid 
transduction) additional copies of the gene into the bacteria ([3a]); integrating 
additional copies of this gene into the bacterial chromosome ([3b]); or using a 
transcriptionally “stronger” promoter to express the endogenous yddG gene ([3c]).136 
After an investigation, the Commission found that there were three groups of 
E. coli strains that CJ used to make the imported product: 
“[E]arlier strains” contained both the native E. coli yddG gene and the native E. coli yddG 
promoter, except that the first nucleotide of the promoter was changed through 
chemical mutagenesis, resulting in a stronger promoter . . . a first “later strain,” which 
contained two copies of a yddG gene: (1) the native E. coli yddG gene with the native E. 
coli yddG promoter; and (2) a non-E. coli yddG gene with two promoters—(2a) a native 
non-E. coli yddG promoter and (2b) an rmf promoter . . . [and a] second “later strain” 
which also contained two copies of a yddG gene: (1) the native E. coli yddG gene with the 
native E. coli yddG promoter; and (2) a codon-randomized non-E. coli yddG gene with two 
promoters—(2a) an rmf promoter and (2b) an rhtB promoter[; the latter two of these 
strains first having been used after Ajinomoto brought its complaint].137 
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) made a final initial determination where 
the phrase, “replacing the native promoter . . . with a more potent promoter” was 
construed to mean “removing the native upstream region of the yddG gene and 
inserting one of a class of promoters that controls expression of a different gene.”138  
Under this construction, the ALJ held that the claims of the ‘655 Patent were invalid 
for failure to satisfy the written description requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) and 
that the imported products did not infringe the ‘655 Patent claims, either literally or 
under the doctrine of equivalents.139  The full Commission reviewed this decision, 
affirming the ALJ’s claim construction and determination of noninfringement of 
the imported products made by the earlier strain, and reversing as to the invalidity 
determination and infringement for products made using the later strains under 
the doctrine of equivalents.140  An exclusion order as to the latter two products 
ensued  and this appeal followed. 
The Federal Circuit affirmed the Commission’s decision in an opinion by Judge 
 
134  Id.  
135  Ajinomoto Co., 932 F.3d at 1346. 
136  Id.  
137  Id. at 1347–48. 
138  Id. at 1348. 
139  Id.  
140  Ajinomoto Co., 932 F.3d at 1348.  
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Taranto joined in full by Judge Moore; Judge Dyk concurred in part and dissented 
in part.  Beginning with the Commission’s claim construction, the panel 
unanimously affirmed that construction and rejected Ajinomoto’s argument that 
the term “encompasses mutagenesis of individual nucleotides within the native 
promoter” rather than being limited to replacement of the native promoter with a 
“stronger” one.141  The Court found that this construction was supported by the 
ordinary and customary meaning of the claim language.142  The opinion asserts that 
“context matters,” stating that “[i]n many contexts, one would not refer to swapping 
out one small component of a larger unit as ‘replacing’ the unit or as providing a 
‘substitute’ for the unit, even though the net result is a differently constituted larger 
unit.”143  This interpretation is consistent with the disclosure in the specification of 
the ‘655 Patent, which tellingly does not recite the term “replacing” but does recite 
the word “substituting,” which the Court held was consistent with the 
Commission’s construction of the phrase.144  And nothing in the prosecution history 
was to the contrary. 145   The opinion recapped the course of prosecution  
amendments and argument relevant to the construction, saying that even though 
patent applicants may have restricted the scope of their claims to a greater extent 
than necessary, “there is no principle of patent law that the scope of a surrender of 
subject matter during prosecution is limited to what is absolutely necessary to avoid 
a prior art reference that was the basis for an examiner’s rejection.”146   Applying this 
principle to rejections under § 112, the Court affirmed the Commission’s 
construction. 
Turning to the Commission’s infringement determinations, the panel agreed 
that imported product made from CJ’s earlier strain did not infringe (either literally 
or under the doctrine of equivalents) but split on whether product made using 
either of the later strains infringed under the doctrine of equivalents. 147   With 
 
141  Id.   
142  Id. at 1349 (using as examples of "replacing" an object "a laptop computer, a bicycle, a sailboat, 
a blender," comprising an interesting Markush group). 
143  Id.  at 1349.  
144  Id. (even reciting in an express example that the promoters were substituted). 
145  Id.  
146  See Ajinomoto Co., 932 F.3d at 1351 (citing Norian Corp. v. Stryker Corp., 432 F.3d 1356, 1361 (Fed. 
Cir. 2005); Biogen Idec, Inc. v. GlaxoSmithKline LLC, 713 F.3d 1090, 1095–96 (Fed. Cir. 2013)); see 
also Donald Zuhn, Biogen Idec, Inc. v. GlaxoSmithKline LLC (Fed. Cir. 2013), Patent Docs (April 17, 
2013)), https://www.patentdocs.org/2013/04/biogen-idec-inc-v-glaxosmithkline-llc-fed-cir-2013.
html [https://perma.cc/569L-6C82]. 
147  Id. at 1348, 1352; see id. at 1361 (Dyk, J., concurring in part).  
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regard to the second of the two later strains, the Commission had “found that the 
YddG protein encoded by the codon-randomized non-E. coli yddG gene of this strain 
is an equivalent of SEQ ID NO:2” recited in claim 9.148  CJ challenged this ruling on 
two grounds: that the amendments made during prosecution raised an estoppel 
against infringement under the doctrine of equivalents  and that the protein 
expressed in CJ’s second strain failed to satisfy the “structure-way-result” rationale 
for infringement under the doctrine.149  Citing Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo 
Kabushiki Co., the majority recognized three exceptions to the scope of prosecution 
history estoppel, with the second of these (that “the rationale underlying the 
amendment may bear no more than a tangential relation to the equivalent in 
question”) being dispositive to the issue before the Court. 150   The basis for the 
majority’s view is that  during prosecution, patentees made an amendment to 
distinguish over prior art that narrowed the scope of the claim from alternatives to 
the protein having an amino acid sequence identified as SEQ ID NO: 2 that differed 
by “deletion, substitution, insertion, or addition of several amino acids.”151   The 
amendment changed the claim language to recite instead “a protein which 
comprises an amino acid sequence that is encoded by a nucleotide sequence that 
hybridizes with the nucleotide sequence of SEQ ID NO:1 under stringent 
conditions.”152  The majority considered the circumstances “unusual” because “the 
original claim provided two alternatives; only the second was modified by 
amendment; and only the first is asserted as the basis for infringement by CJ’s 
second later strain.” 153   The standard to apply in determining whether the 
“tangential relationship” test is adequate to rebut the estoppel “focuses on the 
patentee’s objectively apparent reason for the narrowing amendment.” 154   The 
majority held that Ajinomoto had satisfied this standard: 
The objectively evident rationale for the amendment was to limit the set of proteins 
within the claim’s scope so that it no longer included the prior-art E. coli YfiK protein 
and, more generally, no longer allowed as wide a range of amino acid alterations (hence 
changes in the protein) as original alternative (B), which had allowed “deletion, 
substitution, insertion or addition of one or several amino acids in the amino acid 
 
148  Id. at 1352 (majority opinion).  
149  Id. 
150   Id. at 1353–56 (citing Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 740 
(2002)). 
151  Id. at 1353. 
152  Ajinomoto Co., 932 F.3d at 1353. 
153  Id.  
154  Id. at 1354. 
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sequence shown in SEQ ID NO: 2.”  . . .  The reason for the amendment had nothing to 
do with choosing among several DNA sequences in the redundant genetic code that 
correspond to the same protein.155  Indeed, it was undisputed that the non-E. coli YddG 
protein produced without codon randomization remains within the literal claim scope 
even after the amendment and that the non-E. coli YddG protein is identical whether 
produced from the codon randomized or the non-codon-randomized version of the 
non-E. coli yddG gene.156  
“Accordingly,” according to the opinion, “the reason for the narrowing 
amendment limiting the amino-acid makeup of the proteins included in one of 
the alternatives covered by the claim is unrelated to differences among the several 
DNA sequences that encode a given protein.”157 
Regarding CJ’s second ground of appeal, the majority further found that the 
non-E. coli YddG protein of CJ’s second later strain satisfied the “structure-way-
result” test for infringement under the doctrine of equivalents compared to the 
claimed E. coli YddG protein.158  This conclusion was supported by expert testimony 
as to the function of the two proteins (as “‘export protein[s] that actively export[] 
aromatic L-amino acids and aromatic L-amino acid analogs’ out of the bacterial 
cell”),  as was the “way” prong of the test (based on the 85-95% identical structure 
of the two proteins  and the result (that the consequence of the biochemical activity 
of each protein was for L-tryptophan to accumulate extracellularly).159  The majority 
also rejected CJ’s contention that its strains did not become “resistant” to L-
tryptophan (i.e., could grow in its absence) based on CJ‘s own fermentation 
evidence.160   The majority found no error in any of these conclusions and thus 
affirmed the Commission’s conclusion that the product produced by CJ’s two later 
bacterial strains infringed under the doctrine of equivalents.161 
Finally, the panel unanimously held that asserted claim 20 of the ‘655 Patent was 
not invalid for failure to satisfy the written description requirement.162  The panel 
found that patentees had disclosed a “representative number” of stronger 
promoters and the person of ordinary skill would be cognizant of other members of 
 
155  Id. at 1355 (citation omitted).  
156  Id. 
157  Ajinomoto Co., 932 F.3d at 1355.  
158  Id. at 1356. 
159  Ajinomoto Co., 932 F.3d at 1356.  
160  Id. at 1356–57. 
161  Id. 
162  Id. at 1358; see also id. at 1361 (Dyk, J., concurring in part).  
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this group from, inter alia, prior art disclosures thereof.163  “[T]he genus of more 
potent promoters was already well explored in the relevant art by the time of the ‘655 
Patent’s invention.  In these circumstances, the Commission permissibly found in 
the specification, read in light of the background knowledge in the art, a 
representative number of species for the genus of more potent promoters,” 
according to the panel.164 
Judge Dyk’s dissent was limited to the application of the tangential relationship 
exception to preclude prosecution history estoppel from negating infringement 
under the doctrine of equivalents.165  For Judge Dyk, the amendments to the claims 
of the ‘655 Patent had a direct relationship to the elements at issue (non-E. coli YddG 
protein of CJ’s second later strain  and thus L-tryptophan produced by either of CJ’s 
later two bacterial strains did not infringe under the doctrine.166 
E. *iNo Therapeutics LLC v. Praxair Distribution Inc. 
Albert Einstein once famously (albeit perhaps apocryphally) said that “the 
power of compound interest is the most powerful force in the universe.”167  Not to 
contradict the creator of 20th Century physics, but it is just as likely that the most 
powerful force in the universe is the power of unintended consequences.  The 
Federal Circuit illustrated this power in its decision in iNo Therapeutics LLC v. Praxair 
Distribution Inc. with regard to Justice Breyer’s exhortation in his Mayo Collaborative 
Serv. Inc. v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. opinion, regarding the need to beware of 
“interpreting patent statutes in ways that make patent eligibility ‘depend simply on 
the draftsman’s art’ without reference to the ‘principles underlying the prohibition 
against patents for [natural laws].’”168 
Plaintiffs iNO Therapeutics, LLC  Mallinckrodt Hospital Products Inc  and 
Mallinckrodt Hospital Products IP Inc. asserted U.S. Patent Nos. 8,282,966; 
8,293,284; 8,795,741; 8,431,163; and 8,846,112, which the opinion “collectively [termed 
the] ‘heart failure patents’ or ‘HF patents’” against Praxair Distribution Inc. and 
 
163  Id. at 1358–59 (majority opinion) (four, exactly:  PL promoter of lambda phage, the lac 
promoter, the trp promoter, and the trc promoter).  
164  Id. at 1359. 
165  Ajinomoto Co., 932 F.3d at 1361 (Dyk, J., concurring in part).  
166  Id. at 1361–63. 
167  Allan Roth, Compound Interest – The Most Powerful Force in the Universe?, CBS News (June 7, 2011, 
9:48 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/compound-interest-the-most-powerful-force-in-the-
universe/ [https://perma.cc/7X4E-Z6TX]. 
168  566 U.S. 66, 73 (2012) (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 (1978); see generally 782 Fed. Appx. 
1001 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
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Praxair Inc. 169   Plaintiffs also asserted U.S. Patent Nos. 8,573,209; 8,776,794; 
8,776,795; 9,265,911; and 9,295,802, which the opinion “collectively [termed the] 
‘delivery system infrared patents’ or ‘DSIR patents’” and which were directed to 
devices for administering nitric oxide gas.170  As explained in the opinion, inhaled 
nitric oxide (iNO) gas had been “used to treat infants experiencing hypoxic 
respiratory failure” since at least the early 1990’s.171  However, in certain cases this 
treatment results in increased pulmonary edema for infants having a congenital 
defect, left ventricular hypertrophy. 172   The patents-in-suit were directed to 
methods and a gas delivery device to ameliorate this side-effect, as exemplified by 
the following claims: 
Claim 1 of the ‘741 Patent: 
1.  A method of treating patients who are candidates for inhaled nitric oxide 
treatment, which method reduces the risk that inhalation of nitric oxide gas will 
induce an increase in pulmonary capillary wedge pressure (PCWP) leading to 
pulmonary edema in neonatal patients with hypoxic respiratory failure, the 
method comprising: (a) identifying a plurality of term or near-term neonatal 
patients who have hypoxic respiratory failure and are candidates for 20 ppm 
inhaled nitric oxide treatment; (b) determining that a first patient of the plurality 
does not have left ventricular dysfunction; (c) determining that a second patient of 
the plurality has left ventricular dysfunction, so is at particular risk of increased 
PCWP leading to pulmonary edema upon treatment with inhaled nitric oxide; (d) 
administering 20 ppm inhaled nitric oxide treatment to the first patient; and (e) 
excluding the second patient from treatment with inhaled nitric oxide, based on the 
determination that the second patient has left ventricular dysfunction, so is at particular 
risk of increased PCWP leading to pulmonary edema upon treatment with inhaled 
nitric oxide.173 
 
And claim of the ‘794 Patent: 
1.  A gas delivery device comprising: 
a gas source to provide therapy gas comprising nitric oxide; 
a valve attachable to the gas source, the valve including an inlet and an outlet in 
 
169  iNO Therapeutics, 782 Fed. Appx. at 1002; see also U.S. Patent No. 8,846,112 (filed Nov. 21, 2012); 
U.S. Patent No. 8,795,741 (filed Nov. 21, 2012); U.S. Patent No. 8,431,163 (filed Oct. 15, 2012); U.S. 
Patent No. 8,293,284 (filed June 22, 2010); U.S. Patent No. 8,282,966 (filed June 22, 2010). 
170  iNO Therapeutics, 782 Fed. Appx. at 1002; see also U.S. Patent No. 9,295,802 (filed Feb. 24, 2015); 
U.S. Patent No. 9,265,911 (filed Oct. 29, 2013); U.S. Patent No. 8,776,795 (filed Oct. 29, 2013); U.S. 
Patent No. 8,776,794 (filed Oct. 29, 2013); U.S. Patent No. 8,573,209 (filed Jan. 6, 2011). 
171   iNO Therapeutics, 782 Fed. Appx. at 1002. 
172  Id. at 1002–03.  
173  ‘741 Patent. 
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fluid communication and a valve actuator to open or close the valve to allow the gas 
through the valve to a control module that delivers the therapy gas comprising 
nitric oxide in an amount effective to treat or prevent hypoxic respiratory failure; 
and 
a circuit including: 
a memory to store gas data comprising one or more of gas identification, gas 
expiration date and gas concentration; and 
a processor and a transceiver in communication with the memory to send and 
receive signals to communicate the gas data to the control module that controls gas 
delivery to a subject and to verify one or more of the gas identification, the gas 
concentration and that the gas is not expired.174 
The opinion also notes that the Court had earlier affirmed the PTAB’s invalidation 
of the ‘112 Patent in inter partes review.175  The District Court held the claims of the 
HF patents to be directed to patent-ineligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 
and that Praxair did not infringe the claims of the DSIR patents.176  Mallinckrodt 
appealed. 
The Federal Circuit affirmed-in-part, vacated-in-part, and remanded, in an 
opinion by Chief Judge Prost joined by Judge Dyk; Judge Newman concurred in
part and dissented in part (but the thrust of her opinion dissented from the 
majority’s routine and now conventional, but not capable of being well-understood, 
affirmance that the claims were not eligible for patenting under § 101).177  The Court 
applied its now well-worn (and unnecessarily expansive) interpretation of the 
Supreme Court’s Mayo/Alice test in affirming the District Court.178  Dissecting the 
claims in furtherance of its patent-invalidating efforts, the panel majority first 
states that: 
It is undisputed that treatment of infants experiencing hypoxic respiratory failure with 
iNO gas has existed for decades.  The inventors observed an adverse event that iNO gas 
causes for certain patients.  The patent claim does no more than add an instruction to 
withhold iNO treatment from the identified patients; it does not recite giving any 
affirmative treatment for the iNO-excluded group, and so it covers a method in which, 
for the iNO-excluded patients, the body’s natural processes are simply allowed to take 
place.  Consequently, the claim here is directed to the natural phenomenon.  The claim, 
 
174  iNO Therapeutics, 782 Fed. Appx. at 1003–04 (where the italicized limitations are relevant to 
the Court’s decision).  
175  Id. at 1002 (citing Praxair Distribution, Inc. v. Mallinckrodt Hospital Products IP Ltd., 890 
F.3d 1024, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 2018)); see also id. at 1015 n. 1 (Newman, J., concurring in part) (citing 
Praxair Distribution, 890 F.3d 1024).  
176  Id. at 1004 (majority opinion).  
177  See generally iNO Therapeutics, 782 Fed. Appx. 1001. 
178  Id. at 1005.  
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apart from the natural phenomenon itself, involves only well-understood, routine, and 
conventional steps.  For the reasons below, claim 1 of the ‘741 [P]atent fails to recite 
eligible subject matter.179 
What follows is the majority’s justification for this conclusion.  The natural 
phenomenon is “undisputed” (because the majority defines it as such), the majority 
saying “[a] neonate patient’s body will react to iNO gas in a certain way depending 
on whether or not the patient has a congenital heart condition called LVD,” followed 
by a recitation of the consequences thereof.180  The panel majority then parsed the 
claim language to find that the claims are “directed to” an observation of the natural 
phenomenon they have defined, because the exclusion (from treatment) step 
“merely restates the natural law” (nature it seems providing a caregiver who can give 
the gas as well as knowing without benefit of the invention when to refrain from 
giving it).181  According to the majority: 
Properly understood, this added step [characterized by Mallinckrodt as an “exclusion” 
step] is simply an instruction not to act.  In effect, the claim is directed to detecting the 
presence of LVD in a patient and then doing nothing but leaving the natural processes 
taking place in the body alone for the group of LVD patients.  Accordingly, the claim is 
directed to the natural phenomenon.182 
And to avoid any correspondence with Vanda Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. West-Ward 
Pharmaceuticals International Ltd.,183 the majority asserted: 
Indeed, Mallinckrodt cannot dispute that the patented method does not propose a new 
way of treating LVD patients that leverages this discovery (e.g., by titrating the iNO 
dose).184  Instead, the claim simply requires that the patient not be treated with iNO.  
This is significant because a claim not to treat—i.e., not to disturb these naturally-
occurring physiological processes within the LVD patient’s body—risks monopolizing 
the natural processes themselves.185 
And returning to the opinion’s theme: 
A closer look at the claim language as a whole confirms that the focus of the invention 
is not on a new way of actually treating the underlying condition of hypoxic respiratory 
failure.  Nor does it recite a way of reducing the risk of pulmonary edema while 
providing some level of treatment to those patients.  Rather, the focus of the invention is 
 
179  Id.  
180  Id. at 1005–06.  
181  See id. at 1006.  
182  Id.  
183   See 887 F.3d 1117 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
184  iNO Therapeutics, 782 Fed. Appx. at 1006. 
185  Id. at 1006–07 (citing Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., LLC, 915 F.3d 743, 752 
(Fed. Cir. 2019)). 
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screening for a particular adverse condition that, once identified, requires iNO 
treatment be withheld.  A treatment step of administering a prior art dosage is also 
present.  But that step is plainly not the focus of the claimed invention.  Mallinckrodt 
concedes this step is not innovative.  Mallinckrodt does not point to “any innovation 
other than its [purported] discovery of the natural law.”186  
The opinion also cites Nat. Alternatives Int’l, Inc. v. Creative Compounds, LLC, and Endo 
Pharm. Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., in support of the majority’s distinction between 
these claims and what it considers “method of treatment” claims. 187  The panel 
further distinguished these claims from the patent-eligible claims in Rapid Litigation 
Management Ltd. v. CellzDirect, Inc., (a decision also written by the Chief again on 
the grounds of “a careful reading of the claim language” in those claims and these.188 
With regard to the second step of the Mayo/Alice test, the panel majority rejected 
Mallinckrodt’s argument that the claims possess an “inventive concept.” 189  
Following their wont, the majority found nothing sufficiently novel to warrant 
satisfaction of the second step inquiry.190  It is a tribute to the essential blurring of 
statutory lines engendered by Justice Breyer’s Mayo decision191 that the discussion 
revolves expressly on lack of novelty in performing the eligibility analysis 192  
Understandably, the majority took frank recourse to what they perceive to be the 
parallels between these claims and the claims in Mayo to support their decision.  And 
the majority characterized as a “red herring” Mallinckrodt’s  contentions that their 
claims do not entirely preempt the putative natural phenomenon, surprising in 
view of the role preemption plays in justifying the Supreme Court’s eligibility 
requirements in the first place.193 
The majority’s consideration of infringement of the DSIR patents is more 
 
186  iNO Therapeutics, 782 Fed. Appx. at 1006–07 (citing Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo 
Collaborative Servs., LLC, 915 F.3d 743, 752 (Fed. Cir. 2019)). 
187  Id. at 1008 (citing Nat. Alternatives Int'l, Inc. v. Creative Compounds, LLC, 918 F.3d 1338 (Fed. 
Cir. 2019); Endo Pharm. Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 919 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2019)). 
188  Id. at 1008–09 (citing Rapid Litigation Management Ltd. v. CellzDirect, Inc., 827 F.3d 1042 
(Fed. Cir. 2016)). 
189  Id. at 1010–11.  
190  Id. at 1011.  
191  Albeit much less understandable or forgivable when the nation’s “patent court” does so. 
192  For example, the opinion states: “[t]his would be quite a different case if the inventors had 
invented a new way of titrating the dose” and, citing the District Court (which doesn’t take a 
putatively specialized appellate court to do), “[p]laintiffs cannot seriously contend that it is a new 
practice to exclude certain patients from treatment with a drug when those patients are at an 
increased risk of experiencing negative side effects from the drug.” See id. at 1011–12.  
193  iNO Therapeutics, 782 Fed. Appx. at 1012. 
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legally conventional involving Mallinckrodt’s disagreement with the District 
Court’s construction of the term “verify” in the phrase “verify one or more of the gas 
identification, the gas concentration  and that the gas is not expired.” 194   The 
majority correctly noted that the District Court didn’t formally construe the word
giving it its plain and ordinary meaning. 195   The opinion characterizes this 
argument as Mallinckrodt “attempt[ing] to undo its loss on infringement by 
redrawing the metes and bounds of the claim” and finds this effort “unavailing.”196 
Providing one basis for Judge Newman to agree with her colleagues, the 
opinion reversed a “technical error” by the District Court and remanded for 
correction of the Court’s “clerical error” (specifically, issuing a “blanket” judgment 
on all the claims of the asserted patents rather than limiting it to the asserted 
claims).197 
Judge Newman’s dissent is directed to the eligibility portion of the decision.  In 
her view, the inventors observed a natural phenomenon and then developed a 
treatment method that took advantage of that observation to avoid adverse 
events.198  “The method that is described and claimed does not exist in nature; it was 
designed by and is administered by humans” as the Judge saw things. 199  
Procedurally, Judge Newman faults her colleagues because “[t]he majority 
improperly separates the claims into old and new steps, describes some claim steps 
as a ‘natural phenomenon’ and some steps as ‘well-understood, routine, and 
conventional steps,’ and avoids the requirement that a claimed invention is 
considered as a whole.”200  And “[t]oday’s change of law adds to the inconsistency 
and unpredictability of this area of patent-supported innovation.” 201   In Judge 
Newman’s view, “the majority’s ruling conflicts with extensive precedent” (which 
she extensively cites) as well as “the national interest”:202 
The majority [states that] “we emphasize the narrowness of our holding today, which is 
limited to the particular claims at issue and is driven by the particular circumstances 
here.”  This disclaimer appears at the end of a lengthy exposition, whose wide-ranging 
pronouncements of law and policy are not tied to narrow circumstances or claims.  The 
 
194  Id.  
195  Id.  
196  Id. at 1013. 
197  iNO Therapeutics, 782 Fed. Appx. at 1014; see also id. (Newman, J., concurring in part).  
198  Id. (Newman, J., concurring in part).  
199  Id.  
200  Id.  
201  Id. at 1015 (Newman, J., concurring in part) 
202  iNO Therapeutics, 782 Fed. Appx. at 1016–17.  
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persistent theme of the majority’s analysis is that if a claim contains limitations that 
concern human physiology, ineligibility arises under section 101, whether or not the 
claimed method of medical treatment meets the requirement of patentability.203 
Judge Newman further opined that the majority’s broad pronouncement of 
ineligibility of medical treatment that relates to human physiology not only 
contravened precedent but contravened the national interest in achieving new 
methods of medical treatment with the assistance of the patent incentive.204 
Reaching back more than two centuries, Judge Newman reminded her 
colleagues that patents do not function to “impede scientific and technological 
advance,” citing Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120, 1121 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813  based 
on common law and statutory research exemptions, citing her dissent in Integra 
Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 875 (Fed. Cir. 2003  and Giles 
Sutherland Rich in Principles of Patentability, 28 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 393, 400 (1960) (“It 
should never be forgotten that patented inventions are published and become a part 
of the technical literature.  This publication itself promotes progress in the useful 
arts and it is the prospect of patent rights which induces disclosure and the issuance 
of the patent which makes it available.”).”205 
The majority’s blessedly non-precedential opinion will bring cold comfort to 
patent-divested patentees to the extent it leads patent prosecutors to the inevitable 
conclusion that the Federal Circuit is counseling exactly what Justice Breyer 
cautioned against in Mayo to beware of the clever draftsman who attempts (or 
worse, succeeds) in obtaining claims based predominantly on such claim-drafting 
cleverness.206  This is not the first time that this has been the outcome of the Federal 
Circuit’s patent eligibility jurisprudence.  For example, in In re Roslin, Judge Dyk’s 
opinion held patent-ineligible claims to Dolly the sheep which was, after all, just a 
sheep (notwithstanding being a sheep unlike any sheep that had ever lived).207  But 
a careful review of that opinion leads ineluctably to the conclusion that had the 
draftsman been clever enough (or prescient enough to realize before the fact the 
quantum and quality of cleverness required) to have claimed a flock of genetically 
 
203  Id. at 1017.  
204  Id. 
205  iNO Therapeutics, 782 Fed. Appx. at 1017–18 (Newman, J., concurring in part) (citing Integra 
Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 875 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Newman, J., dissenting)); 
Giles Sutherland Rich, Principles of Patentability, 28 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 393, 400 (1960)).  
206  Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 69 (2013) (citing 
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 (1978)). 
207  See In re Roslin Inst. (Edinburgh), 750 F.3d 1333, 1334, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014).  
 
B I O T E C H N O L O G Y  P A T E N T  L A W  T O P  T E N  O F  2 0 1 9  
305 
identical sheep, the Court’s objections to patent ineligibility would have perforce 
fallen, because it would be undeniable that flocks of genetically identical sheep do 
not occur in nature.  This state of affairs is frankly Byzantine and antithetical to 
Congress’s purpose (uniformity and predictability in U.S. patent law) for creating 
the Federal Circuit, as well as being contrary to the principles of clarity and the 
creation of “bright line rules” that arguably prompted the Supreme Court to begin 
its heightened scrutiny of the Court and its opinions (if not philosophy).  The 
Federal Circuit’s current path is contrary to the idea that patent claims should be 
readily understandable to well-intended business people and frank (or in current 
parlance, “efficient”) infringers alike and also contrary to the Founders’ attitudes 
regarding patenting as a way to encourage disclosure of new inventions for the 
public good.  Having such a path will give little relief to those who have lost patent 
rights under the current regime, but at least it provides a way for inventors to obtain 
patent-eligible claims no matter what other branches of government do in 
addressing this issue.  Innovation, especially in the diagnostic and life sciences arts, 
requires no more and is entitled to no less. 
F. *Athena Diagnostics v. Mayo Collaborative Services (February 12, 2019) 
and (July 3, 2019) (per curiam, from denial for rehearing en banc) 
The Athena case illustrated in the starkest of terms the consequences of the 
Supreme Court’s ill-advised Mayo/Alice test for subject matter ineligibility and the 
Federal Circuit’s failure to apply the test in a manner that would reign in its 
innovation-inhibiting effects.208 
The claims at issue were claims 6–9 of U.S. Patent No. 7,267,820,209 which recite: 
6.  A method for diagnosing neurotransmission or developmental disorders related to 
muscle specific tyrosine kinase (MuSK) in a mammal comprising the step of detecting 
in a bodily fluid of said mammal autoantibodies to an epitope of muscle specific tyrosine 
kinase (MuSK), wherein said method comprises the steps of: a) contacting said bodily 
fluid with muscle specific tyrosine kinase (MuSK) or an antigenic determinant thereof; 
and b) detecting any antibody-antigen complexes formed between said receptor 
tyrosine kinase or an antigenic fragment thereof and antibodies present in said bodily 
fluid, wherein the presence of said complexes is indicative of said mammal suffering 
from said neurotransmission or developmental disorders, wherein said antibody-
antigen complex is detected using an anti-IgG antibody tagged or labeled with a 
reporter molecule, whereby the intensity of the signal from the anti-human IgG 
antibody is indicative of the relative amount of the anti-MuSK autoantibody in the 
 
208  See generally Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., LLC, 915 F.3d 743 (Fed. Cir. 
2019), petition for reh’g denied per curiam, 927 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
209  Athena Diagnostics, 915 F.3d at 746; see also U.S. Patent No. 7,267,820 (filed June 15, 2001). 
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bodily fluid when compared to a positive and negative control reading.  
7. A method according to claim 1, comprising contacting MuSK or an epitope or 
antigenic determinant thereof having a suitable label thereon, with said bodily fluid, 
immunoprecipitating any antibody/MuSK complex or antibody/MuSK epitope or 
antigenic determinant complex from said bodily fluid and monitoring for said label on 
any of said antibody/MuSK complex or antibody/MuSK epitope or antigen determinant 
complex, wherein the presence of said label is indicative of said mammal is suffering 
from said neurotransmission or developmental disorder related to muscle specific 
tyrosine kinase (MuSK).  
8.  A method according to claim 7 wherein said label is a radioactive label.  
9.  A method according to claim 8 wherein said label is I.210 
These claims were invalidated at the District Court on a motion to dismiss under 
Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6).211  This decision was affirmed by a Federal Circuit panel on 
February 19, 2019  in an opinion by Judge Lourie joined by Judge Stoll and over a 
vigorous dissent by Judge Newman.  As has been the frustrating reality over the 
course of several years, the majority rendered its decision as being mandated by the 
Supreme Court’s decisions in Mayo and Alice  despite maintaining a philosophical 
position that such an application of this jurisprudence was wrong  and inhibited 
rather than promoted innovation and progress.212 
It is unnecessary to belabor these opinions by the panel, because the Federal 
Circuit’s salient illustration of the disjointed opinions on its own  and the Supreme 
Court’s eligibility jurisprudence was put on frank and open display when the court, 
per curiam, denied Athena’s petition for rehearing en banc. 213   This opinion was 
accompanied by four concurrences and four dissents, representing the thinking of 
every member of the court. Comparisons of some of the thinking of the judges 
provides insights into how the members of the Court view their role in the judicial 
scheme regarding patent law. 
Judge Lourie, joined by Judges Reyna and Chen, voiced the view, first 
enunciated by Judge Linn in Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc,214 that  as an 
 
210  U.S. Patent No. 7,267,820 (the italicized portions set forth in claim 6 were derived from claims 
1, 2, and 3, from which claim 6 ultimately depended). 
211  Athena Diagnostics, 915 F.3d at 746–47.  
212  See id. at 749.  
213  See Donald Zuhn, Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Services, LLC (Fed. Cir. 2019), 
Patent Docs (July 09, 2019), https://www.patentdocs.org/2019/07/athena-diagnostics-inc-v-
mayo-collaborative-services-llc-fed-cir-2019.html#comments [https://perma.cc/V3JN-3ZHE]. 
214  Kevin E. Noonan, Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2015), Patent Docs (June 
22, 2015), https://www.patentdocs.org/2015/06/ariosa-diagnostics-inc-v-sequenom-inc-fed-cir-
2015.html [https://perma.cc/TWL2-WCT3]. 
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inferior appellate court, its hands are tied by the Supreme Court’s decisions in Mayo 
Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 215 Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank 
Int’l,216 and Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.217: 
If I could write on a clean slate, I would write as an exception to patent eligibility, as 
respects natural laws, only claims directed to the natural law itself, e.g., E=mc2, F=ma, 
Boyle’s Law, Maxwell’s Equations, etc.  I would not exclude uses or detection of natural 
laws.  The laws of anticipation, obviousness, indefiniteness, and written description 
provide other filters to determine what is patentable . . . . But we do not write here on a 
clean slate; we are bound by Supreme Court precedent.218 
This view is apparently shared by seven of the Court’s twelve members.  
Judge O’Malley enunciated the countervailing view regarding what the Court 
should do to change this state of affairs.  In her opinion the Court has gone astray 
in slavishly and too stringently applying the Supreme Court’s precedent to 
unnecessarily restrict the scope of what is eligible (particularly with regard to 
diagnostic method claims, including the ones at issue before the Court in Athena): 
I agree with all my dissenting colleagues that our precedent applies the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 132 S.Ct. 
1289, 182 L.Ed.2d 321 (2012) too broadly.  I write separately, however, because I believe 
that confusion and disagreements over patent eligibility have been engendered by the 
fact that the Supreme Court has ignored Congress’s direction to the courts to apply 35 
U.S.C. sections 101, et seq (“Patent Act”) as written.  Specifically, the Supreme Court has 
instructed federal courts to read into Section 101 an “inventive concept” requirement—
a baffling standard that Congress removed when it amended the Patent Act in 1952.  I 
encourage Congress to amend the Patent Act once more to clarify that it meant what it 
said in 1952.219 
It is clear that Congress is the ultimate (or perhaps only) solution.  But if Judge 
O’Malley identifies the Federal Circuit’s complicity in engendering the current 
situation, Judge Newman (joined by Judge Wallach) in dissent enumerated the 
Court’s application of Supreme Court precedent to diagnostic method claims, all of 
 
215  Kwame Mensah, Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. (2012), PATENT DOCS 
(Mar. 20, 2012), https://www.patentdocs.org/2012/03/mayo-collaborative-services-v-
prometheus-laboratories-inc-2012.html [https://perma.cc/22YS-3Q3C].  
216  Kevin E. Noonan, Supreme Court Issues Decision in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, Patent Docs (June 
19, 2014), https://www.patentdocs.org/2014/06/supreme-court-issues-decision-in-alice-corp-v-
cls-bank.html [https://perma.cc/SS3U-XYJM]. 
217  Donald Zuhn, Supreme Court Issues Decision in AMP v. Myriad, Patent Docs (June 13, 2013), 
https://www.patentdocs.org/2013/06/supreme-court-issues-decision-in-amp-v-myriad.html 
[https://perma.cc/QU49-GB37]. 
218  Athena, 927 F.3d at 1335 (Lourie, Rena, Chen, JJJ., concurring). 
219  Id. at 1371 (O’Malley, J., dissenting).  
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these decisions invalidating the patents at issue: 
1. In re BRCA1- & BRCA2-Based Hereditary Cancer Test Patent Litigation, 774 F.3d 755 (Fed. 
Cir. 2014).  The claimed invention is a method for screening for genes linked to inherited 
breast and ovarian cancer, by analyzing for certain mutations in the DNA. The court 
held the claims ineligible under section 101 as directed to a law of nature, and also held 
that identifying genetic mutations is an ineligible abstract idea.220 
2. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015).  The claimed 
invention is a method for detecting paternally inherited fetal abnormalities by 
analyzing the blood or serum of a pregnant female.  The court held the claims ineligible 
under section 101, while recognizing that “detecting cffDNA in maternal plasma or 
serum that before was discarded as waste material is a positive and valuable 
contribution to science.” Id. at 1380. 221   
3. Genetic Technologies Ltd. v. Merial L.L.C., 818 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2016).  The claimed 
invention is a method for detecting a coding region of DNA based on its relationship to 
non-coding regions, by amplifying genomic DNA with a primer spanning a non-coding 
sequence in genetic linkage to an allele to be detected.  The court stated that “the patent 
claim focuses on a newly discovered fact about human biology.”222 
4. Cleveland Clinic Foundation v. True Health Diagnostics LLC, 859 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
The claimed invention is a method for diagnosing risk of cardiovascular disease by 
analyzing for the enzyme myeloperoxidase (“MPO”).  The court held that even though 
prior methods for detecting MPO were inferior, the discovery of how to directly analyze 
for MPO, and discovery of the relation to the risk of cardiovascular disease, although 
“groundbreaking, ‘even such valuable contributions can fall short of statutory 
patentable subject matter.’”223  
5. Roche Molecular Systems, Inc. v. CEPHEID, 905 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2018).  The claimed 
invention is a method for detecting the pathogenic bacterium Mycobacterium tuberculosis 
(MTB), based on nucleotide content and a novel method of analysis.  The court stated 
that the method is new, unobvious, and “both faster and more accurate than the 
traditional MTB detection methods,” id. at 1366, but held that the method is ineligible 
 
220  Id. at 1367 (Newman, J., dissenting); see also Kevin E. Noonan, In re BRCA1- and BRCA2-based 
Hereditary Cancer Test Patent Litigation (Fed. Cir. 2014), Patent Docs (Dec. 17, 2014), 
https://www.patentdocs.org/2014/12/in-re-brca1-and-brca2-based-hereditary-cancer-test-
patent-litigation-fed-cir-2014.html [https://perma.cc/W2L7-UBF3]. 
221  Athena, 927 F.3d at 1367 (Newman, J., dissenting); see also 788 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
222  Athena, 927 F.3d at 1367 (Newman, J., dissenting); see also Kevin E. Noonan, Genetic Technologies 
Ltd. v. Merial L.L.C. (Fed. Cir. 2016), PATENT DOCS (Apr. 10, 2016), https://www.patentdocs.org/
2016/04/genetic-technologies-ltd-v-merial-llc-fed-cir-2016.html [https://perma.cc/V6A6-
NMWG].  
223  Athena, 927 F.3d at 1367 (Newman, J., dissenting); see also Kevin E. Noonan, Cleveland Clinic 
Foundation v. True Health Diagnostics LLC (Fed. Cir. 2017), Patent Docs (June 26, 2017), 
https://www.patentdocs.org/2017/06/cleveland-clinic-foundation-v-true-health-diagnostics-llc-
fed-cir-2017.html [https://perma.cc/QTM9-G9A5].  
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under section 101.224 
6. Cleveland Clinic Foundation v. True Health Diagnostics LLC, 760 F. App’x 1013 (Fed. Cir. 
2019).  The claimed invention is the novel immunoassay to detect the correlation 
between blood MPO levels and cardiovascular disease.  The court held that the claims 
are for a law of nature and ineligible under section 101.225 
Conversely, as Judge Newman notes in her dissent, the Federal Circuit has 
repeatedly affirmed eligibility of “method of treatment” claims, in Rapid Litigation 
Management Ltd. v. CellzDirect, Inc.; Vanda Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. West-Ward 
Pharmaceuticals International Ltd.; Natural Alternatives Int’l, Inc. v. Creative Compounds, 
LLC; and Endo Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.226
Both Judge Moore (writing in dissent) and Judge Chen (concurring) also 
recognize the problematic nature of the Court’s jurisprudence on patent eligibility.  
And each agree with Judge O’Malley  that Congress alone can address the issue, 
Judge Moore stating that: 
In the wake of Mayo, we have painted with a broad brush, suggesting that improved 
diagnostic techniques are not patent eligible.  Mayo did not go so far, and given the 
import of diagnostic techniques, we should reconsider this case and clarify our 
precedent.  Because my colleagues have declined to do so, there are no more options at 
this court for diagnostic patents.  My colleagues’ refusal deflates the Amici’s hopeful 
suggestion that our precedent leaves the eligibility of a diagnostic claim in front of the 
Federal Circuit “uncertain.”  It is no longer uncertain.  Since Mayo, every diagnostic 
claim to come before this court has been held ineligible.  While we believe that such 
claims should be eligible for patent protection, the majority of this court has definitively 
concluded that the Supreme Court prevents us from so holding. No need to waste 
resources with additional en banc requests.227 
Judge Hughes, joined by Chief Judge Prost and Judge Taranto  concurred with 
the per curiam denial of en banc review, albeit not without some reservations: 
I, for one, would welcome further explication of eligibility standards in the area of 
diagnostics patents.  Such standards could permit patenting of essential lifesaving 
 
224  Athena, 927 F.3d at 1367–68 (Newman, J., dissenting); see also Kevin E. Noonan, Roche Molecular 
Systems, Inc. v. Cepheid (Fed. Cir. 2018), Patent Docs (Oct. 10, 2018), https://www.patentdocs.org/
2018/10/roche-molecular-systems-inc-v-cepheid-fed-cir-2018.html [https://perma.cc/7H2C-
D2H9].  
225  Athena, 927 F.3d at 1368 (Newman, J., dissenting) (including Athena there are seven such 
cases); see also Donald Zuhn, Cleveland Clinic Foundation v. True Health Diagnostics LLC (Fed. Cir. 
2019), Patent Docs (Apr. 07, 2019), https://www.patentdocs.org/2019/04/cleveland-clinic-
foundation-v-true-health-diagnostics-llc-fed-cir-2019.html [https://perma.cc/3MML-W2VL].  
226  Athena, 927 F.3d at 1368 (Newman, J., dissenting) (citing 827 F.3d 1042 (Fed. Cir. 2016); 887 F.3d 
1117 (Fed. Cir. 2018); 918 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2019); 919 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2019).  
227  Athena, 927 F.3d at 1362 (Moore, J., dissenting).  
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inventions based on natural laws while providing a reasonable and measured way to 
differentiate between overly broad patents claiming natural laws and truly worthy 
specific applications.  Such an explication might come from the Supreme Court.  Or it 
might come from Congress, with its distinctive role in making the factual and policy 
determinations relevant to setting the proper balance of innovation incentives under 
patent law.228 
 
Judge Chen also concurred: 
When it comes to applying the judicial exceptions, it bears noting that the Mayo 
analytical approach is considerably harder to apply consistently than the Diehr 
framework, and more aggressive in its reach.  Consider the claim in Mayo.  If that claim 
had recited just the single step of administering a synthetic drug to a patient, that 
single-step claim would be patent-eligible, but lack novelty under § 102.  And if that 
claim added a second step for determining the subsequent level of a non-naturally 
occurring metabolite in a patient, that claim also would pass muster under § 101, but 
lack novelty.  But when the claim further recites a relationship between a metabolite 
level and its efficacy in a patient, that claim suddenly would be invalid under § 101 for 
violating the law of nature exception.  In other words, steps 1 and 2 now get pushed aside 
and declared insignificant, and the last step is designated as the “focus” of the claim, i.e., 
the heart of the invention.  The notion that adding claim language can convert an 
otherwise patent-eligible claim into a patent-ineligible claim is counterintuitive and a 
very difficult thing to explain to 8,000 patent examiners.  Moreover, the process of 
determining what the claim is “really about” when the claim is viewed in pieces, rather 
than as a whole, can be highly subjective and impressionistic.229 
Judge Dyk wrote most extensively, joined by Judge Hughes and in part by Judge 
Chen. Informative nuggets of this opinion include: 
[T]here is tension between Mayo and the Supreme Court’s later decision in Association 
for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 133 S.Ct. 2107, 186 L.Ed.2d 124 
(2013), and that the holding of Mayo may be overbroad.  The language of § 101 does cover 
“discover[ies],” 35 U.S.C. § 101, and there is no doubt that determining the relationship 
between specific genetic abnormalities and specific diseases constitutes an important 
discovery with proven utility.  There is much to be said for the patentability of claims to 
such discoveries, if not drafted overbroadly.230 
But he also sees some benefits in the Court’s approach to subject matter eligibility: 
In the realm of abstract ideas, the Mayo/Alice framework has successfully screened out 
claims that few would contend should be patent eligible, for example, those that merely 
apply well-known business methods and other processes using computers or the 
Internet.  The Mayo/Alice framework has thus proven to be both valuable and effective 
 
228  Id. at 1337 (Hughes, J., concurring).   
229  Id. at 1348–49 (Chen, J., concurring).  
230  Id. at 1340 (Dyk, J., concurring).  
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at invalidating overly broad, non-inventive claims that would effectively “grant a 
monopoly over an abstract idea.”231 
Judge O’Malley provided an additional avenue for Congressional intervention
The Judge notes the Supreme Court’s resurrection of the “inventive concept” trope  
which many believed was relegated to the dustbin of history by Section 103 in Giles 
Sutherland Rich’s revision resulting in the 1952 Patent Act. 232   She provides an 
alternative to Senator Tillis’ and Coons’ proposed statutory abrogation of the 
judicial exceptions (which raises its own issues on Congressional authority and the 
Supreme Court’s oversight on ultra vires legislative actions).  Judge O’Malley’s 
suggestion is direct: 
Had the Supreme Court not disregarded Congress’s wishes for a second time [by 
introducing “inventive concept” into its Section 101 calculus], perhaps the outcome in 
this case would be different. . . .  Indeed, claims directed to uses of natural laws rather 
than the natural laws themselves would be eligible under § 101 as written.  Because the 
Supreme Court judicially revived the invention requirement and continues to apply it 
despite express abrogation, I dissent to encourage Congress to clarify that there should 
be no such requirement read into § 101; to clarify that concepts of novelty and 
“invention” are to be assessed via application of other provisions of the Patent Act 
Congress designed for that purpose.233 
And Judge Moore is characteristically direct in setting forth the consequences 
of the Federal Circuit’s refusal to consider the eligibility of Athena’s claims en banc: 
Since Mayo, every diagnostic claim to come before this court has been held ineligible.  
While we believe that such claims should be eligible for patent protection, the majority 
of this court has definitively concluded that the Supreme Court prevents us from so 
holding.  No need to waste resources with additional en banc requests.  Your only hope 
lies with the Supreme Court or Congress. I hope that they recognize the importance of 
these technologies, the benefits to society, and the market incentives for American 
business.  And, oh yes, that the statute clearly permits the eligibility of such inventions 
and that no judicially-created exception should have such a vast embrace. It is neither a 
good idea, nor warranted by the statute.234 
For those keeping score, it appears that all (or almost all) of the members of the 
Court believe that their patent eligibility cases have been wrongly decided. Chief 
Judge Prost, joined by Judges Lourie, Dyk, Reyna, Hughes, Taranto, and Chen  
believe the Court’s hands are tied by Supreme Court precedent, while Judges 
Newman, Moore, O’Malley, Wallach, and Stoll believe the Federal Circuit has the 
basis to distinguish Supreme Court precedent and hold these claims (or at least 
 
231  Id. at 1337.  
232  See Athena, 927 F.3d at 1371 (O’Malley, J., dissenting).  
233  Id. at 1373.  
234  Id. at 1363 (Moore, J., dissenting).  
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claims 7 9 of Athena’s claims at issue) are patent eligible. 
The issue for the Federal Circuit is not just that their views are so fractured, but 
that the dissension between the Judges has precluded the benefits envisioned when 
the Federal Circuit was created. The Judges apparently cannot decide whether they 
should simply apply Supreme Court precedent (even incorrectly) until such time as 
the Supreme Court deigns to address the issue, or whether their "special expertise" 
and Congressional mandate creates a responsibility to distinguish the Supreme 
Court's precedent when it does not properly apply. And the dissension prevents the 
Court from at least providing incentive to the Supreme Court to provide (in its view) 
the correct interpretation of what is and what is not patent eligible.  In at least the 
view of five of the judges (and many in the patent bar) the Federal Circuit has failed 
in exercising its responsibility, to the extent that many openly speculate whether 
U.S. patent law needs the Federal Circuit at all. 
G. Vanda Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. West-Ward Pharmaceuticals Int’l. Ltd. 
(Fed Cir. 2018) 
The Federal Circuit’s decision in Vanda Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. West-Ward 
Pharmaceuticals Int’l. Ltd. hat the method of treatment claims were likely to be patent 
eligible provided a ray of hope with regard to the fraught nature of subject-matter 
eligibility in life sciences patenting.235  
 The case arose in ANDA litigation over Vanda’s methods for treating 
schizophrenia with Fanapt® (iloperidone), particularly directed to adjusting 
(reducing) dosages in patients expressing a variant of a cytochrome P450 2D6 gene 
(CYP2D6) that metabolizes this and other drugs more poorly than other alleles of 
the gene. 236   This genotype is significant because it is associated with a 
predisposition to cause QTc prelongation, a condition that can result in serious 
heart problems.237  On inspection  the parallels with the facts in Mayo Collaborative 
Services v Prometheus Labs are evident. 
Vanda asserted two patents, Reissue Patent RE 39,198 and U.S. Patent No. 
8,586,610, The ‘610 Patent issued after ANDA litigation had been initiated over the 
‘198 Patent and expires significantly later. This procedural posture raised a 
jurisdictional issue over whether the District Court could include this patent in the 
ANDA litigation (the Federal Circuit ruled that it could).238 
 
235  See generally Athena, 927 F.3d 1333; see generally 887 F.3d 1117 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
236  Id. at 1122.  
237  Id. at 1121.  
238  Vanda, 887 F.3d 1120–22; see also U.S. Patent No. 8,586,610 (filed Sep. 30, 2005); U.S. Patent No. 
RE 39,198 (filed Nov. 15, 2000). 
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Claim 1 of the ‘610 Patent was considered representative by the Court: 
A method for treating a patient with iloperidone, wherein the patient is suffering from 
schizophrenia, the method comprising the steps of: 
determining whether the patient is a CYP2D6 poor metabolizer by: 
obtaining or having obtained a biological sample from the patient;  
and 
performing or having performed a genotyping assay on the biological sample to 
determine if the patient has a CYP2D6 poor metabolizer genotype; and  
if the patient has a CYP2D6 poor metabolizer genotype, then internally administering 
iloperidone to the patient in an amount of 12 mg/day or less, and 
if the patient does not have a CYP2D6 poor metabolizer genotype, then internally 
administering iloperidone to the patient in an amount that is greater than 12 mg/day, 
up to 24 mg/day,  
wherein a risk of QTc prolongation for a patient having a CYP2D6 poor metabolizer 
genotype is lower following the internal administration of 12 mg/day or less than it 
would be if the iloperidone were administered in an amount of greater than 12 mg/day, 
up to 24 mg/day.239 
The District Court found the ‘198 and ‘610 atents not invalid and the ‘198 Patent 
infringed by West-Ward’s ANDA filing under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2.  West-Ward also 
was liable of inducing infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b). Infringement was 
dependent on West-Ward’s proposed label, which was substantially identical to 
Vanda’s Fanapt® label and recited a “recommendation” that (1) “practitioners use 
iloperidone to treat patients suffering from schizophrenia”; (2) “oral administration 
of iloperidone tablets at 12 to 24 mg/day to nongenotypic CYP2D6 poor metabolizers 
and 12 mg/day or less to genotypic CYP2D6 poor metabolizers”; and (3) 
“practitioners perform or have performed a genotyping assay to determine whether 
patients are CYP2D6 poor metabolizers.” 240 
Regarding West-Ward’s invalidity contentions, the District Court rejected 
challenges based on §§ 101, 103, and 112(a written description). Specifically with 
regard to subject-matter eligibility, the District Court held that while the asserted 
claims depended upon laws of nature they were not directed to those laws. They 
thus satisfied the subject matter eligibility requirements under the Supreme Court’s 
Mayo/Alice test: 
First, we determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of those patent-
ineligible concepts.  If so, we then ask, “[w]hat else is there in the claims before us?”  To 
answer that question, we consider the elements of each claim both individually and “as 
an ordered combination” to determine whether the additional elements “transform the 
 
239  Vanda, 887 F.3d at 1121.  
240  Id. at 1122–23. 
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nature of the claim” into a patent-eligible application.  We have described step two of 
this analysis as a search for an “inventive concept”— i.e., an element or combination of 
elements that is “sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly 
more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.”241 
Finally, the District Court held that the provisions for delaying FDA approval 
until after expiration of patents asserted in ANDA litigation under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 271(e)(4)(A) were not available remedies for infringement of the ‘610 Patent under 
35 U.S.C. § 271(b).  Therefore, the court was able to exercise its “general equitable 
power” to impose an equivalent injunction.242 
The Federal Circuit affirmed, in an opinion by Judge Lourie joined by Judge 
Hughes, with Chief Judge Prost dissenting on the subject-matter eligibility 
question.  The opinion affirmed the resolution of the procedural issues that had 
arisen in the ANDA litigation context and the District Court’s determination that 
the asserted claims were not invalid under §§ 103 and 112(a). 243   But it is the 
majority’s opinion on the § 101 question that is of particular interest here.  
Judge Lourie refuted West-Ward’s analogy of these claims to the claims in Mayo 
(“This case, however, is not Mayo”). First, in his view the Mayo claims “were not 
directed to a novel method of treating a disease,” but rather they “were directed to a 
diagnostic method based on the ‘relationships between concentrations of certain 
metabolites in the blood and the likelihood that a dosage of a thiopurine drug will 
prove ineffective or cause harm.’” 244   The Supreme Court interpreted the Mayo 
claims to merely recite a relationship that is “a consequence of the ways in which 
thiopurine compounds are metabolized by the body—entirely natural processes.  
And so a patent that simply describes that relation sets forth a natural law.”245 
Importantly, the opinion notes the distinction that the Mayo claims “w[ere] not 
directed to the application of a drug to a particular disease” (again, the 
administering step being well-known in the art).246  And even the Supreme Court in 
its Mayo decision recognized the distinction between the Mayo claims and “method 
of [medical] treatment” claims here, wherein the Supreme Court stated “[u]nlike, 
 
241  Id. at 1133–34 (citing Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014) (citations 
omitted) (alteration in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72-73, 75-79))). 
242  Id. at 1123.  
243  See id. at 1123, 1136, 1140.  
244  Vanda Pharm., 887 F.3d at 1134 (The frank reliance on other sections of the patent statute in 
arriving at eligibility determinations, while once jarring and even now of dubious doctrinal 
provenance should be expected by now). 
245  Id.  
246  Id.  
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say, a typical patent on a new drug or a new way of using an existing drug, the patent 
claims do not confine their reach to particular applications of those laws.”247 
Here, the majority notes, while the inventors recognized the relationships 
between “iloperidone, CYP2D6 metabolism, and QTc prolongation,” that is not what 
they claimed; “[t]hey claimed an application of that relationship.”248 The majority 
recognizes this to be an example of “a new way of using an existing drug” that had 
received, albeit in dicta, the Supreme Court’s imprimatur of eligibility in Mayo.249  
The opinion also notes that the claims at issue here do not implicate undue 
preemption that was a concern (perhaps the concern) in Mayo, because the Mayo 
claim was not a treatment claim and could (at least in theory) be infringed even if a 
doctor did not change treatment decisions as a consequence of practicing the 
claimed method.250  This distinction was significant for the court because it “did not 
involve doctors using the natural relationship between the metabolite level and 
lessening ‘the likelihood that a dosage of a thiopurine drug will prove ineffective or 
cause harm.’”251 
The majority found support for these distinctions in the court’s Rapid Litigation 
Management v. Cellzdirect opinion. 252   There, “a method of producing a desired 
preparation of multi-cryopreserved hepatocytes cells” was determined to be patent 
eligible because it employed “the natural ability of the subject matter to undergo the 
process,” which did not make those claim “directed to” the natural phenomenon 
under the Mayo/Alice principles.253 
The crux (and perhaps the genius) of Judge Lourie’s distinctions between the 
invention claimed by Vanda and the patent-ineligible claims in Mayo is best 
identified by a litany of specificities. Namely, “the claims here are directed to a 
specific method of treatment for specific patients using a specific compound at specific 
doses to achieve a specific outcome (emphases added).”254  
The panel majority held that these claims recited more than the natural 
relationship, in distinction with Mayo, but rather a method of using these 
relationships to treat patients, beneficially reducing the risk of developing 
 
247  Id. at 1134–35. 
248  Vanda Pharm., 887 F.3d at 1135 (reviewing U.S. Patent No. 8,586,610 (filed Sep. 30, 2005)). 
249  Id.  
250  Id.  
251  Id.  
252  Vanda Pharm., 887 F.3d at 1142 (citing Rapid Litig. Mgmt. Ltd. v. CellzDirect, Inc., 827 F.3d 
1042, 1049 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). 
253  See id. at 1142–43. 
254  Id. at 1136. 
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treatment complications.255 
Chief Judge Prost did not see these distinctions and believed that these claims 
were indistinguishable from the claims in Mayo and hence should be patent-
ineligible.256 
 The Supreme Court denied certiorari  thus, for now, method of medical 
treatment  fall outside the proscription on life sciences patenting as applied, 
for example, to diagnostic method claims (see, Athena Diagnostics).257 
H. *Idenix Pharma v. Gilead Sciences 
Section 112 of the Patent Act as codified, entitled “Specification” in the statute, 
specifies the amount of disclosure required to support a patent claim, among other 
requirements.258  Section 112(a) contains three requirements:  written description, 
enablement, and best mode.259  In Idenix Pharmaceuticals LLC v. Gilead Sciences Inc., 
the Federal Circuit held that Idenix’s patent was invalid on two grounds, affirming 
the District Court’s overturning of a jury verdict on enablement and the District 
Court’s post-trial denial of judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) regarding 
satisfaction of the written description requirement. 260   In doing so, the Court 
illustrated ways in which it has been able to impose its views on both aspects of 
Section 112 requirements despite its reliance on fact finding by the jury or district 
court below (with Judge Newman characteristically dissenting from what she 
viewed as appellate court overreach by her brethren).261 
The case arose in litigation over Idenix’s U.S. Patent No. 7,608,597 that was 
directed to drugs for treating hepatitis C virus (HCV), which Idenix alleged Gilead 
would infringe by launch of its sofobuvir (Solvadi®) HCV treatment. 262  
Independent claim 1 of the ‘597 Patent is representative of Idenix’s invention: “1.  A 
method for the treatment of a hepatitis C virus infection, comprising administering 
an effective amount of a purine or pyrimidine -D-2’-methyl-ribofuranosyl 
nucleoside or a phosphate thereof, or a pharmaceutically acceptable salt or ester 
 
255  Id. (reviewing ‘610 Patent). 
256  Id. at 1143 (Prost, J., dissenting) (reviewing ‘610 Patent).  
257  Athena, 915 F.3d at 750. 
258  35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012). 
259  Id. § 112(a) (although the latter has been in something of a state of limbo since the Leahy-
Smith America Invents Act (AIA) disabled it as a defense). 
260  See generally Idenix Pharm. 941 F.3d 1149.  
261  Id. at 1154, 1163, 1166 (Newman, J., dissenting).  
262  Id. at 1153 (reviewing U.S. Patent No. 7,608,597 (filed June 20, 2003)).  
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thereof.”263 The opinion illustrates the structure of the purine or pyrimidine -D-2’-
methyl-ribofuranosyl nucleoside as disclosed in the ‘597 Patent: 
 
which differs from naturally occurring embodiments by the substitution of a methyl 
group at the 2’ position on the ribofuranosyl sugar, cis to the nitrogenous base (or in 
the “up” position as understood by the Federal Circuit).264  Gilead argued (and the 
District Court and Federal Circuit agreed) that the ‘597 Patent specification did not 
provide guidance regarding the “billions” of possible molecules falling within the 
scope of the claims.265  This argument was based on the acknowledged difference 
between the compounds exemplified in the ‘597 Patent (having a hydroxyl, -OH, 
group at the 2’ “down” position), while Gilead’s accused infringing compound had a 
fluorine atom at that position. 266   After protracted (“years,” according to the 
opinion) litigation, the District Court conducted a jury trial in which Gilead 
conceded infringement but challenged the ‘597 Patent claims as failing to satisfy the 
Section 112(a) enablement requirement.267  This trial resulted in a jury verdict that 
Idenix’s ‘597 Patent claims were not invalid for lack of enablement under Section 
112(a).268  The Court granted Gilead’s JMOL motion overturning the jury’s verdict 
but denied Gilead’s JMOL motion that the claims were invalid for failing to satisfy 
the written description requirement.269  This appeal followed. 
The Federal Circuit affirmed the District Court’s JMOL decision on enablement 
and reversed the District Court’s denial of JMOL on written description, in an 
opinion by Chief Judge Prost joined by Judge Wallach; Judge Newman dissented.270  
The majority rendered its decision under the de novo review standard applied to 
JMOL motions, which permitted the appellate panel to more easily dismiss the jury’s 
 
263  U.S. Patent No. 7,608,597 (filed June 20, 2003). 
264  Idenix Pharm., 941 F.3d at 1155 (reviewing U.S. Patent No. 7,608,597 (filed June 20, 2003)).  
265  Id.  
266  Id.  
267  Id. at 1161.  
268  Id. at 1153.  
269  Idenix Pharm., 941 F.3d at 1153. 
270  See id. at 1149, 1166 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
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factual determinations.271  The majority opinion characterized the issue before the 
Court as “whether a person of ordinary skill in the art would know, without undue 
experimentation, which 2’-methyl-up nucleosides would be effective for treating 
HCV.” 272   The majority held that the answer to this question is no, because “a 
reasonable jury would not have had a legally sufficient basis to find otherwise.”273  
The opinion rendered its decision by applying the factors delineated in In re Wands, 
858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988): (1) the quantity of experimentation necessary; (2) 
how routine any necessary experimentation is in the relevant field; (3) whether the 
patent discloses specific working examples of the claimed invention; (4) the amount 
of guidance presented in the patent; (5) the nature and predictability of the field; (6) 
the level of ordinary skill; and (7) the scope of the claimed invention.274 
For context in appreciating how the majority applied the Wands factors, it is 
relevant to consider that the chemical arts have traditionally been considered 
unpredictable as compared with, for example, mechanical inventions.  A 
mechanical device comprising a fastener, for example, could have as embodiments 
a handful of alternatives (e.g., a screw, a nail, a rivet, a bolt, glue, Velcro Chemical 
compounds, in contrast, can have a multiplicity of substituents at a multiplicity of 
positions in a molecule, wherein the permutations can quickly exceed hundreds of 
thousands to millions, while but a few hundred exemplary compounds are disclosed 
in the specification.275  The biotechnological arts are even more complex, for at least 
two reasons.  First, the molecules are even larger and have the capacity for 
additional substitutions, and the effects of those substitutions on function of 
biological molecules are themselves unpredictable. 276   These scientific facts 
engendered the Federal Circuit’s explication of the application of the written 
description requirement of Section 112 that culminated in the Court’s en banc Ariad 
v. Eli Lilly decision (as well as earlier promulgation of Guidance from the U.S. Patent 
and Trademark Office in 2001). 277   Paradoxically, biotechnology patents (unlike 
chemical patents) do not disclose hundreds of exemplars (and frequently only one 
 
271  Id. at 1154.  
272  Id. at 1156.  
273  Id.  
274  Id.  
275  See id. at 1157. 
276  See Idenix Pharm., 941 F.3d at 1161.  
277  See Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1357-58 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Kevin E. Noonan, 
Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co. (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc), Patent Docs (Mar. 22, 2010), 
https://www.patentdocs.org/2010/03/ariad-pharmaceuticals-inc-v-eli-lilly-co-fed-cir-2010-en-
banc.html. [https://perma.cc/K4EZ-TX6Q]. 
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or a few), which has led to the scope of biotechnology claims to be relatively 
narrow.278 
These considerations provide an opportunity for the Federal Circuit to apply the 
factors set out in Wands stringently to find failure to satisfy the enablement 
requirement of Section 112(a), as the Court did here.  Going in order, the majority 
agreed with the District Court that the amount of experimentation required to 
support the “billions and billions” of putative species was high, supported by 
Gilead’s expert testimony. 279   The District Court and the majority held that 
experimentation was too high even if mitigating circumstances would have 
presented a much smaller number of species (thousands) to the person of ordinary 
skill in the art.280  This aspect of Idenix’s argument was contradicted by its own 
evidence that “the field of modifying nucleosides for anti-HCV activity was ‘in its 
infancy’ and ‘unpredictable.’”281  This conclusion was also supported by evidence 
that “many” of the candidate nucleosides would need to be synthesized because they 
were not commercially available, although the majority acknowledges that such 
synthesis was routine.282 
The majority then turned to the “working examples” and “amount of guidance” 
factors, which the opinion not surprisingly held supported non-enablement.283  The 
opinion asserts in support of this conclusion that “Claim 1 requires more than just 
an identification of 2’-methyl-up: it requires identification of which 2’-methyl-up 
nucleosides will effectively treat HCV” and that “[w]ithout specific guidance on that 
point, the specification provides ‘only a starting point, a direction for further 
research.’”284   The (un)predictability prong of the factors was supported by trial 
testimony from both parties’ experts, and the claim scope prong (essentially 
overbreadth) followed from the majority’s conclusions regarding the rest of the 
factors.285  The opinion’s discussion characterized the situation as the person of skill 
in the art “the ‘large number’ of 2’-methyl-up nucleosides falls into the ‘small’ group 
of candidates that effectively treats HCV.”286 
 
278  See Idenix Pharm., 941 F.3d at 1161.  
279  See id. at 1157.  
280  See id.  
281  Id. at 1159. 
282  Id.  
283  Id. at 1160. 
284  Idenix Pharm., 941 F.3d at 1160 (citing ALZA Corp. v. Andrx Pharms., LLC, 603 F.3d 935, 941 
(Fed. Cir. 2010)) (reviewing ‘597 Patent). 
285  Id. at 1160–61. 
286  Id. at 1162.  
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As a consequence of these analyses, the majority readily concluded that the 
District Court correctly granted JMOL because no reasonable jury could conclude 
anything other than that Idenix did not satisfy the written description 
requirement.287  The opinion notes that their decision has “striking similarities” to 
Wyeth and Cordis Corp. v. Abbott Laboratories based on the “millions of compounds 
made by varying the substituent groups” in that case wherein “only a ‘significantly 
smaller’ subset of those compounds would have the claimed ‘functional effects.’”288  
The opinion says that the decision here, as in Wyeth, “rests on the ‘limits on 
permissible experimentation,’” and states the somewhat new principle that 
“[w]here, as here, ‘practicing the full scope of the claims would have required 
excessive experimentation, even if routine,’ the patent is invalid for lack of 
enablement.”289 
Turning to the written description issue, the majority readily pivoted from its 
enablement decision to hold that the ‘597 Patent specification fails to provide an 
adequate written description because there was insufficient evidence that the 
Idenix inventors possessed the invention throughout its full scope.290  In particular, 
the majority held that there was no evidence that the ‘597 Patent inventors were in 
possession of Gilead’s product.291  As has been the case since the Federal Circuit’s 
seminal decision in Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly, the absence of 
explicit disclosure of this species, in the further absence of a sufficient number of 
species to define a genus comprising Gilead’s species, or structure/function 
relationships that would ensnare this species within the scope of the species 
expressly disclosed, was enough for the majority to conclude that the specification 
failed to satisfy the written description requirement.292 
The majority rejected Idenix’s argument that the specification provided 
“abundant traditional blazemarks for the claims—working examples, formulas, 
data, synthesis routes, and the target,” stating that the flaw in this analysis was that 
Idenix provided “lists or examples of supposedly effective nucleosides, but do not 
explain what makes them effective, or why.” 293   In almost the reverse of the 
 
287  Id. at 1162, 1164. 
288  Id. 
289  Idenix Pharm., 941 F.3d at 1163 (citing Wyeth & Cordis Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 720 F.3d 1380, 1384 
(Fed. Cir. 2013)). 
290  Id. at 1164 (reviewing ‘597 Patent).  
291  Id. at 1165.  
292  See Idenix Pharm., 941 F.3d at 1165; see Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 
1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
293  See id. at 1164.  
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majority’s reasoning regarding enablement, the opinion states that “the 
specification lists tens or hundreds of thousands of possible nucleosides, 
substituent-by-substituent, with dozens of distinct stereochemical structures, and 
yet the compound in question is conspicuously absent.”294 
Judge Newman dissented; the tone of the dissent, and that of a footnote in the 
majority opinion regarding the dissent, denotes a certain impatience on the part of 
both authors with the opinions of the other.  Judge Newman contends that “[t]he 
large number of unclaimed chemical variants in the specification are not described, 
not synthesized, and not tested for antiviral activity”, and thus “[i]t is incorrect to 
include these variants in the claims and then to invalidate the claims because these 
variants are not described and not enabled.”295  The Judge believes that a reasonable 
jury could have considered the claims as being limited to the much smaller number 
of species exemplified in the specification and thus both enabled and adequately 
described. 296   She characterizes the majority’s enablement theory as flawed for 
requiring description of “unclaimed and unsupported subject matter,” and states 
that “a reasonable jury could have understood that subject matter that is unclaimed 
is irrelevant to validity under Section 112.”297 
In Judge Newman’s view, the claims are limited by what is exemplified in the 
specification; interpreting claim scope necessarily restricts the scope to that 
disclosure. 298   This is certainly a more parsimonious interpretation than the 
majority’s and has the advantage that it would guard against a patentee expanding 
the scope of a claim to encompass species that a conscientious competitor pursues 
in an effort to avoid the claim.  The dissent recites copiously (eighteen separate 
citations, with the opinion stating there are “much more” ) from the expert 
testimony in this regard.299  Judge Newman asserts that: 
It was undisputed that the ‘597 Patent specification did not describe and enable 
products other than those whose synthesis and antiviral properties were shown in the 
specification, all of which had the narrow formula of three OH groups and a CH3 group 
 
294  Id. at 1165.  
295  Id. at 1165–66 (Newman, J., dissenting) (reviewing ‘597 Patent) (this argument harkens back 
to the facts in Wands, where the Patent and Trademark Office contended experimentation was 
undue because only 4 of 143 monoclonal antibodies showed the claimed activity, whereas the 
Federal Circuit reversed because only 9 of the 143 clones had been tested, raising the percentage 
from less than 3% to about 44%).  
296  Idenix Pharm, 941 F.3d at 1166.  
297  Id.  
298  Id. at 1168 (Newman, J., dissenting) (reviewing ‘597 Patent).  
299  Id. at 1165–1173. 
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as pictured.  A reasonable jury could have so viewed the claims.300   
She further states the jurisprudential principle that “[c]ourts are not free to 
reweigh the evidence and set aside the jury verdict merely because the jury could 
have drawn different inferences or conclusions or because judges feel that other 
results are more reasonable.”301  Judge Newman concludes her dissent by stating 
that, despite Gilead’s stipulation of infringement, the proper outcome of this case 
would be that the ‘597 Patent claims were not invalid (when properly cabined to the 
scope supported by the specification) and not infringed by Gilead’s fluorinated 
product (based on testimony as well as the absence of this species in the ‘597 Patent 
disclosure).302 
In her own way, Judge Newman is putting her appellate thumb as heavily on the 
scale as did the majority. In contrast, her jurisprudence would preserve the patent 
within the scope of the disclosure while absolving Gilead of infringement, while the 
majority’s approach seems to be to interpret the claims broadly to reach the 
conclusion that they are invalid.  This decision continues the appearance, illustrated 
most starkly in the court’s decision denying rehearing en banc in Athena Diagnostics 
v. Mayo Collaborative Services, 303  that the court is seriously fractured in how it 
approaches its role as principal arbiter of U.S. patent law. 
I. Nalpropion Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Actavis Laboratories FL, Inc. (Fed. 
Cir. 2019) 
In Nalpropion Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Actavis Laboratories FL, Inc., the Federal 
Circuit reversed findings of non-obviousness and affirmed (over Chief Judge Prost’s 
dissent) a finding that claims asserted in ANDA litigation were not invalid for 
failure to satisfy the written description requirement. 304 
ANDA litigation arose over Nalpropion Pharma’s Contrave® extended-release 
tablets of the combination of naltrexone hydrochloride and buproprion 
hydrochloride, for treatment of obesity, and Orange Book-listed U.S. Patent Nos. 
7,375,111; 7,462,626; and 8,916,195. 305   The following claims were at issue in this 
 
300  Idenix Pharm, 941 F.3d at 1171. 
301  Id. (citing Tennant v. Peoria & P.U. Ry. Co., 321 U.S. 29, 35 (1944)). 
302  Id. at 1173. 
303  See Donald Zuhn, Athena Diagnostics v. Mayo Collaborative Services -- The Dissents, Patent Docs 
(July 17, 2019), https://www.patentdocs.org/2019/07/athena-diagnostics-v-mayo-collaborative-
services-the-dissents.html. [https://perma.cc/BZ3H-3QH2]. 
304  934 F.3d 1344, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
305  Nalpropion Pharm., 934 F.3d at 1346; see U.S. Patent No. 7,375,111 (filed Apr. 21, 2004); U.S. 
Patent No. 7,462,626 (filed Feb. 17, 2006); U.S. Patent No. 8,916,195 (filed June 4, 2007).  
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litigation: 
Claim 11 of the ‘195 Patent: 
A method of treating overweight or obesity having reduced adverse effects 
comprising orally administering daily about 32 mg of naltrexone and about 360 mg 
of bupropion, or pharmaceutically acceptable salts thereof, to a person in need 
thereof, wherein the bupropion or pharmaceutically acceptable salt thereof is 
administered as a sustained release formulation, wherein the naltrexone or 
pharmaceutically acceptable salt thereof is ad- ministered as a sustained release 
formulation, and wherein said sustained release formulation of naltrexone has an 
in vitro naltrexone dissolution pro- file in a dissolution test of USP Apparatus 2 
Paddle Method at 100 rpm in a dissolution medium of water at 37° C. of: 
a) between 39% and 70% of naltrexone re- leased in one hour; 
b) between 62% and 90% of naltrexone re- leased in two hours; and 
c) at least 99% in 8 hours; 
wherein about 16 mg of said sustained re- lease formulation of naltrexone or 
a pharmaceutically acceptable salt thereof is administered twice daily, and 
about 180 mg of said sustained release formulation of bupropion or a 
pharmaceutically acceptable salt thereof is administered twice daily.306 
Claim 1 of the ‘111 Patent: 
A composition for affecting weight loss comprising: 
(a) a sustained release formulation of bupropion or a pharmaceutically 
acceptable salt thereof in an amount effective to in- duce weight loss in an 
individual; and 
(b) a sustained release formulation of naltrexone or a pharmaceutically 
acceptable salt thereof in an amount effective to enhance the weight loss 
effect of the bupropion or salt thereof; 
wherein said composition is in a single oral dosage form fixed combination.307 
And claims 26 and 31 of the ‘626 Patent: 
A method of treating overweight or obesity, comprising administering a weight loss effective 
amount of a first and second compound to an individual who has been diagnosed as suffering 
from overweight or obesity in order to treat said overweight or obesity, wherein said first 
compound is bupropion, or a pharmaceutically acceptable salt thereof, and said second 
compound is naltrexone, or a pharmaceutically acceptable salt thereof, and wherein the 
weight loss activity of said first and second compounds is enhanced compared to the 
administration of the same amount of either compound alone, wherein said naltrexone, 
or a pharmaceutically acceptable salt thereof, and said bupropion, or a 
pharmaceutically acceptable salt thereof, are administered together. 
 
 
306  ‘195 Patent. 
307  ‘111 Patent. 
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A method of treating overweight or obesity, comprising administering a weight loss effective 
amount of a first and second compound to an individual who has been diagnosed as suffering 
from overweight or obesity in order to treat said overweight or obesity, wherein said first 
compound is bupropion, or a pharmaceutically acceptable salt thereof, and said second 
compound is naltrexone, or a pharmaceutically acceptable salt thereof, and wherein the 
weight loss activity of said first and second compounds is enhanced compared to the 
administration of the same amount of either compound alone, wherein at least one of said 
maltrexone, or parmaceutically acceptable salt thereof, and said bupropion, or 
pharmaceutically acceptable salt thereof are in a sustained-release formulation, wherein 
said bupropion, or a pharmaceutically acceptable salt thereof, and said naltrexone, 
or a pharmaceutically acceptable salt thereof, are administered in a single oral 
dosage form.308 
The District Court found that defendant Actavis had not established that claim 
11 of the ‘195 Patent was invalid for failure to satisfy the written description 
requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) with regard to the claim limitation reciting USP 
dissolution methods (“USP1” versus “USP2”).309  The claims expressly recited the 
USP 2 Paddle Method, but Actavis argued that the specification disclosed only the 
UPS 1 Basket Method.310  The District Court based its decision on the fact that a 
skilled worker would have no doubt that the inventors had possession of the 
invention based on the nature of the dissolution method disclosed in the 
specification. 311   The Court held that disclosure of a “substantially equivalent 
method” was sufficient to satisfy the requirement.312 
The District Court also rejected Actavis’ arguments that claims 26 and 31 of the 
‘626 Patent and claim 1 of the ‘195 Patent were obvious, on the grounds that  Actavis’ 
argument that “it would have been obvious for a person of skill to combine 
bupropion and naltrexone for treating overweight and obesity because both drugs 
were known to cause weight loss,” amounted to “a classic case of hindsight bias.”313 
The Federal Circuit reversed the District Court regarding its obviousness 
decision in an opinion by Judge Lourie, joined by Chief Judge Prost and Judge 
Wallach, and affirmed the District Court on its written description determination 
over Chief Judge Prost’s dissent.  The majority’s written description decision was 
based in part on the “peculiarity” of the structure of claim 11. This claim is directed 
 
308  ‘626 Patent at col. 40 l. 20–30, 45–48 (filed Feb. 17, 2006) (where the italicized portions of these 
claims were recited in independent and/or dependent claims related to asserted claims 26 and 31).  
309  See Nalpropion Pharm., 934 F.3d at 1348 (reviewing ‘195 Patent).  
310  Id.  
311  Id.  
312  Id.  
313  See Nalpropion Pharm., 934 F.3d at 1348 (reviewing ‘626 Patent and ‘195 Patent).  
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to a method for treating obesity using specific amounts of the two drugs and 
reciting the method for determining the dissolution profile of what the majority 
termed “resultant in vitro parameters,” which were not the “operative steps to treat 
overweight or obesity.”314  The majority found no clear error in the District Court’s 
holding that “irrespective of the method of measurement used, the specification 
shows that the inventors possessed the invention of treating overweight or obesity 
with naltrexone and bupropion in particular amounts and adequately described 
it.” 315   The majority noted that this determination by the District Court was 
supported by more credible testimony from Nalpropion Pharma’s expert and 
“untrustworthy, self-serving statements by Actavis’s expert.”316  The majority stated 
that it refused to disturb the District Court’s weighing of witness credibility in the 
performance of its “fact-finding function.”317  The majority further recognized (in 
the face of the Chief Judge’s dissent) that “[w]hile as a general matter written 
description may not be satisfied by so-called equivalent disclosure,” under these 
facts the District Court had not clearly erred.318 
Turning to the District Court’s non-obvious determination for claims 26 and 31 
of the ‘626 Patent and claim 11 of the ‘111 Patent, the panel unanimously held these 
determinations to be error as a matter of law.319  The opinion sets forth the teachings 
of the asserted references, characterizing them as disclosing the use of an opioid 
antagonist like naltrexone and “withdrawal attenuating agents,” including 
buproprion for minimizing weight gain, inter alia, during smoking cessation, and 
bupropion or naltrexone alone in weight loss regimes. 320   The Federal Circuit 
disagreed with the District Court’s conclusion of non-obviousness, stating that: 
The prior art here discloses the claimed components of the composition claims and the 
steps of the method claims including the use claimed by the method . . . .  The references 
teach that bupropion causes weight loss . . . .  Likewise, the record indicates that 
naltrexone can cause weight loss . . . .  Given that both drugs had shown weight loss 
effects, we conclude that a person of ordinary skill would have been motivated to 
combine them.  In fact, such persons did so.321 
The panel rejected as unpersuasive Nalpropion Pharma’s argument that the FDA 
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would not and had not approved buproprion for weight loss.  The panel found that 
this was not dispositive to the question of whether the skilled worker would have 
had a motivation to combine the asserted references.322  Further, the opinion states: 
The inescapable, real-world fact here is that people of skill in the art did combine 
bupropion and naltrexone for reductions in weight gain and reduced cravings—goals 
closely relevant to weight loss.  Contrary to Nalpropion Pharma’s view, persons of skill 
did combine the two drugs even without understanding bupropion’s  mechanism of 
action but with an understanding that bupropion was well-tolerated and safe as an 
antidepressant.  . . .  (“The precise mechanism for bupropion SR that is responsible for 
effects on weight loss is unknown.”)  . . .  Thus, we conclude that skilled artisans would 
have been motivated to combine the two drugs for weight loss with a reasonable 
expectation of success [citations to the record omitted].323 
The Court found “every limitation of the claims at issue” was found in the asserted 
art. The panel also rejected Nalpropion Pharma’s purported evidence for secondary 
considerations (failure of others, unexpected results) to rebut their finding that 
these claims were obvious.324  According to the Court, “the inventors only combined 
two drugs known to affect weight loss.  Both drugs were known to affect weight loss, 
and combining them for this known purpose as claimed in the patents yields no 
unpredictable result.”325  The Federal Circuit thus found claim 11 of the ‘195 Patent 
and claims 26 and 31 of the ‘626 Patent to be invalid for obviousness. 
The Chief Judge’s dissent on the written description question was based on the 
majority’s reliance on “substantially equivalent disclosure” to support claim 
language not having clear and explicit support in the specification.326  The Chief 
Judge characterizes the majority’s decision as “add[ing] what appears to me to be a 
new rule to this court’s long-standing written description jurisprudence.”327  She 
sets forth three reasons for her disagreement with the majority: “[f]irst, the USP 2 
clause is limiting.  Second, the majority’s ‘substantially equivalent’ rule is 
inconsistent with this court’s precedent.  Third, the district court clearly erred in 
finding that the ‘195 Patent’s written description includes a disclosure ‘substantially 
equivalent’ to USP 2.”328 
Important to the Chief Judge’s’ reasoning, inter alia, were arguments from the 
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prosecution history where the patentee appeared to rely on the dissolution profile 
(and the manner of determining it) to distinguish the claims from the prior art.329  
The Chief also disagreed with the District Court’s’ (and the majority’s) disregard for 
defendant’s expert testimony.  The Chief asserted that that the USP1 and USP2 
methods would not have produced the same dissolution profile results to have been 
relevant to the written description issue before each court.330 
J. Nuvo Pharmaceuticals (Ireland) Designated Activity Co. v. Dr. Reddy’s 
Laboratories Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2019) 
There are provisions and interpretations of U.S. patent law that can be in 
tension depending on the circumstances under which they are argued, whether 
before an Examiner or during litigation.  One of these is the dichotomy between 
arguing that the prior art would provide insufficient expectation of success to 
render an invention obvious, while at the same time relying on what was known by 
a person of skill in the art to minimize the extent of the written description provided 
in a specification that satisfies the written description requirement of 35 U.S.C. 
§ 112(a).  This tension proved fatal to the claims at issue in Nuvo Pharmaceuticals v. 
Dr. Reddy’s’ Laboratories, decided by the Federal Circuit.331 
The case arose as ANDA litigation against Dr. Reddy’s’ Labs (and Mylan and 
Lupin entities) over non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs (NSAIDs) formulated to 
diminish recognized gastrointestinal irritation side effects these drugs can cause; 
the formulations being claimed in Orange Book-listed U.S. Patent Nos. 6,926,907 
and 8,557,285 and sold by Nuvo as Vimovo®.332  The prior art disclosed efforts to 
avoid these side effects by co-administration of NSAIDs with proton pump 
inhibitors (PPIs), because stomach acid was believed to contribute to them.333  These 
efforts were disadvantageous, inter alia, because stomach acid degraded the PPIs 
before they could be absorbed in the small intestine and have their acid-diminishing 
effect in the stomach.334  The art showed attempts to remedy these shortcomings by 
enterically coating PPIs to resist stomach acid.  These efforts did not entirely solve 
the problem because the NSAID was degraded if released into the stomach before 
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the PPI could reduce stomach acid (e.g., raising the pH by inhibiting the proton 
pump responsible for producing the acidic environment therein).335 
The inventor of the ‘907 Patent invented a new formulation “that coordinated 
the release of an acid inhibitor and an NSAID in a single tablet,” the formulation 
comprising a core of an NSAID, enterically coated so that the coating dissolves only 
at an elevated pH, and then providing an amount of a PPI sufficient to provide pH 
elevated to the enteric cost dissolving level.336   
Claim 1 of the ‘907 Patent and claim 1 of the ‘285 Patent are each set forth as 
representative in the Federal Circuit’s opinion, respectively: 
1.  A pharmaceutical composition in unit dosage form suitable for oral administration 
to a patient, comprising: 
(a) an acid inhibitor present in an amount effective to raise the gastric pH of said 
patient to at least 3.5 upon the administration of one or more of said unit dosage 
forms; 
(b) a non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drug (NSAID) in an amount effective to 
reduce or eliminate pain or inflammation in said patient upon administration of 
one or more of said unit dosage forms; 
and wherein said unit dosage form provides for coordinated release such that: 
i) said NSAID is surrounded by a coating that, upon ingestion of said unit 
dosage form by said patient, prevents the release of essentially any NSAID 
from said dosage form unless the pH of the surrounding medium is 3.5 or 
higher; 
ii) at least a portion of said acid inhibitor is not surrounded by an enteric 
coating and, upon ingestion of said unit dosage form by said patient, is 
released regardless of whether the pH of the surrounding medium is below 
3.5 or above 3.5. 
 
1.  A pharmaceutical composition in unit dosage form comprising therapeutically 
effective amounts of: 
(a) esomeprazole, wherein at least a portion of said esomeprazole is not 
surrounded by an enteric coating; and 
(b) naproxen surrounded by a coating that inhibits its release from said unit dosage 
form unless said dosage form is in a medium with a pH of 3.5 or higher; 
wherein said unit dosage form provides for release of said esomeprazole such that upon 
introduction of said unit dosage form into a medium, at least a portion of said 
esomeprazole is released regardless of the pH of the medium.337 
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While the specification (according to the panel opinion) disclosed many features of 
the claimed invention, “[i]t is undisputed that there is no experimental data 
demonstrating the therapeutic effectiveness of any amount of uncoated PPI and 
coated NSAID in a single dosage form,” nor is there any disclosure of formulations 
wherein uncoated PPI could be used to raise gastrointestinal pH.338 
The District Court found that Defendants had not shown the asserted claims to 
be obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103 nor not enabled or inadequately described under 
35 U.S.C. § 112, and thus, that one of Dr. Reddy’s generic products did not infringe 
the ‘907 Patent (granting summary judgment to Dr. Reddy’s on its noninfringement 
motion).339  Specifically, the Court found that it would not have been obvious to use 
a PPI according to the asserted claims to prevent gastrointestinal injury from an 
NSAID, inter alia, because the art would have discouraged attempting such 
formulations due to the known acid sensitivity of PPIs.340  Moreover, the District 
Court held that the claims were enabled because the specification disclosed how to 
make and use the invention.  The Court relied on expert testimony in deciding that 
the skilled worker would have recognized the usefulness of the claimed 
formulations.341 
With regard to Dr. Reddy’s written description challenges, the District Court 
found that the use of the transition term “comprising” in the ‘285 Patent claims did 
not cause the claims to encompass (undisclosed) embodiments having uncoated, 
immediately released naproxen (an exemplified NSAID).342  The Court also rejected 
a second challenge, that the claims encompass sustained-release as well as delayed-
release NSAID formulations not supported by the specification, because the claims 
recited “inhibiting” rather than “preventing” NSAID release prior to achieving the 
claimed raised pH levels. 343   Finally, the District Court rejected Defendants’’ 
argument that “ordinarily skilled artisans would not have expected [the claimed 
formulation] to work and the specification provides no experimental data or 
analytical reasoning showing the inventor possessed an effective uncoated PPI.”344  
The Court held that “experimental data and an explanation of why an invention 
works are not required, the specification adequately describes using uncoated PPI, 
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and its effectiveness is necessarily inherent in the described formulation.”345 
This appeal followed, limited to the District Court’s findings on the first and 
third written description arguments; Nuvo cross-appealed on the District Court’s 
grant of summary judgment of non-infringement by Dr. Reddy’s second 
formulation. 
The Federal Circuit reversed the District Court’s’ decision and dismissed Nuvo’s 
cross-appeal, in an opinion by Judge Clevenger, joined by Chief Judge Prost and 
Judge Wallach.  The opinion states that the panel’s’ analysis “begins and ends” with 
Defendants’ third written description argument related to a failure to show 
“efficacy” of the claimed formulation.346  According to the Federal Circuit, the issue 
was raised by Nuvo’s argument (related to Defendants’ obviousness assertions) that 
“ordinarily skilled artisans would not have expected uncoated PPIs to be 
effective.”347  Inconsistently, “nothing in the specification would teach a person of 
ordinary skill in the art otherwise,” and this failure to disclose what was not found 
in the art (and indeed, Nuvo affirmatively contended was not known in the art with 
regard to the obviousness issue) amounts to a failure to describe how the inventors 
were in possession of the claimed invention.348  The District Court’s error, according 
to the Federal Circuit, was that its written description analysis on this point “does 
not support its conclusions.”349   Because of the “clear error” standard of review 
imposed on the Federal Circuit on questions of fact (as the adequacy of disclosure 
sufficient to satisfy the written description requirement is), the opinion asserts that 
the panel “scour[ed] the record created below for evidence supporting the District 
Court’s written description finding.”350 
To no avail.  In part, the panel came to this conclusion because they appreciated 
that Nuvo raised “at least five arguments” (“for the first time on appeal, and as its 
lead argument”) directed to reading any effectiveness language or requirement 
from the asserted claims. 351   These arguments were, in the panel’s view, 
contradicted by the plain language (and plain meaning thereof) of the claims (claim 
1 of the ‘907 Patent recites “. . . in an amount effective to raise the gastric pH of said patient 
to at least 3.5,” and claim 1 of the ‘285 Patent recites “. . . comprising therapeutically 
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effective amounts of [the PPI].”)352  But the opinion sets forth and rejects each one. 
First, Nuvo argued that the dosage form as a whole does not need to be effective 
in raising gastric pH; the Federal Circuit agreed but did not find any of Defendants’ 
argument to be to the contrary.353 
Second, Nuvo argued that the claims do not require the NSAID and PPI to be in 
a single dosage form but “only amounts of each component effective on their 
own.”354  Defendants argued that the claim “requires coordinated release achieved 
by an effective amount of uncoated PPI that raises the gastric pH to at least 3.5 and 
an effective amount of naproxen that is released to treat pain when the pH reaches 
the desired level”; the panel held that Nuvo had not presented this argument below, 
and thus it was forfeited.355 
Third, Nuvo contended that the claim didn’t require the uncoated PPI to be 
effective to raise gastric pH, just that the formulation contained an effective 
amount of uncoated PPI.356  In addition to holding Nuvo had also forfeited this 
argument by not raising it below, the panel termed it “nonsensical to read the claims 
to require effective amounts of uncoated PPI without specifying the result 
effectively achieved.”357 
Fourth, Nuvo asserted that the claims encompassed “multiple dosage forms,” 
and thus, the specification did not need to expressly describe any particular 
effective dosage form.358  Rather than summarily dismissing this argument, the 
opinion expressly disagreed with it:  the ‘285 Patent “does not allow for more than 
one dosage form” and “[e]ven if it were true that the ‘907 [P]atent allows more than 
one dosage form to effectively raise the gastric pH to at least 3.5 using uncoated PPI, 
the specification would still need to provide support for the notion that uncoated 
PPI is effective,” according to the Court.359 
Finally, the panel rejected Nuvo’s’ argument that the Examiner interpreted the 
claims in a manner consistent with their argument, that “the ‘907 [P]atent claims [] 
merely require[d] certain amounts of PPI and NSAID effective on their own rather 
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than requiring an overall efficacy for the combined drug.” 360   The panel found 
Nuvo’s argument relied in this regard on arguments the Court had already rejected 
and besides, in their view “the Examiner appears to have interpreted the claims to 
require an amount of PPI, whether coated or uncoated, effective to raise the gastric 
pH to the desired level” and that was the written description required (and lacking) 
in Nuvo’s specification.361 
Having decided what the law requires the written description to be, the panel 
then reported its failure to find such support in the specification.  Nuvo’s attempt 
to rely on expert testimony was unavailing, in part because this testimony was 
sufficiently particular that the Court was able to review and reject it.  Specifically, 
the opinion states that: 
The statements [the expert] points to recite the claim limitation by simply calling 
generally for effective amounts of uncoated PPI, but our precedent clearly establishes 
that is not enough . . . .  We have expressly rejected the “argument that the written 
description requirement . . . is necessarily met as a matter of law because the claim 
language appears in ipsis verbis in the specification.”362   
Experimental evidence is not required,363 nor is there any requirement for a 
“theory or explanation of how or why a claimed composition will be effective,”364  nor 
does an invention need to be reduced to practice.365  But here, “there is nothing in 
the specification of the patents-in-suit showing ‘that the inventor actually invented 
the invention claimed.’”366  The Court concluded that the specification is “fatally 
flawed” with regard to providing an adequate written description of the requisite 
efficacy recited in the claims and reversed the District Court’s finding that 
Defendants had not established that the ‘907 and ‘285 Patents were invalid for 
failure to satisfy the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112.367 
I I I . C O N C L U S I O N S  
Many other biotechnology patent court cases were decided in 2019.  The patent 
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interference dispute over CRISPR/Cas9 inventions continued, with Sigma Aldrich 
attempting to provoke an interference that would surely render this dispute even 
more complicated.  Congress turned its attention again to 35 U.S.C. § 101, though 
without tangible results, while the Supreme Court refused to grant certiorari on 
several petitions concerning § 101.  Many other issues of patent doctrine were 
explored, such as public use, on-sale bars to patentability, and experimental use 
exceptions,368 but did not make our cut of the top 10 biotechnology patent decisions 
of 2019. 
For half a century, biotechnology patent law has occupied a niche in the wider 
realm of patent law.  Highlighting fascinating scientific discoveries, promising new 
approaches to solving human problems at some undefined point in the future, and 
posing various interesting challenges to existing legal doctrine; biotechnology has 
nevertheless been widely regarded as a small and eccentric niche of patent law.  The 
SARS-CoV-2 virus and the COVID-19 pandemic it has caused has shone a bright 
light on the clear and present importance of biotechnology and how patent law 
ought to approach it to ensure humanity receives full benefits from its powerful 
discoveries.  Suddenly, biotechnology stands at the vanguard of patent law, 
transforming the sound crafting, interpretation, and application of biotechnology 
law high on the list of societal priorities.  Vaccines offer a vivid example of this, with 
new and innovative approaches, such as mRNA-based methods, raising worldwide 
hopes for a cure to COVID-19 and to the economic and social ravages it has caused.  
Biotechnology patent law will play an increasingly important role in helping to 
respond to societal issues.  Understanding it better is an immediate imperative.  
We began our effort to choose and describe the 10 most important 
biotechnology patent decisions in Biotechnology Patent Law Top Ten of 2018 - Broad 
Wins, Sovereignty Loses, and Patents Dance.369 We intend to continue this effort each 
year, with our next article covering the 10 most important biotechnology patent 
decisions of 2020.  
 
368  See Barry v. Medtronic, Inc., 914 F.3d 1310, 1320–21 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
369  Kevin E. Noonan & Andrew W. Torrance, Biotechnology Patent Law Top Ten of 2018 - Broad Wins, 
Sovereignty Loses, and Patents Dance, 52 Akron L. Rev. 637, 637–38 (2018). 
 
